

HOW DEAN COULD WIN ■ NOVAK ON WILSON'S WAR

JULY 28, 2003

The American Conservative

SEX & CONSEQUENCES

**An Anthropologist
Defends Traditional
Marriage**

By Peter Wood




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
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
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
DEATH OF THE WEST

According to the Centers for Disease Control, last year the American birth rate fell to its lowest level ever. There were only 13.9 births per 1,000 persons in 2002 versus the recent high of 16.7 per 1,000 in 1990. The empirical reasons for the drop are several—one encouraging (a decline in teenage pregnancy), most quite the opposite. Because our population is aging, we have fewer women of childbearing age. And of that smaller pool, fewer at peak fertility (their 20s and early 30s) are having children, while older women are having more. (There is, of course, a biological limit to the number—not to mention the health—of children older women can bear.) This pattern seems to confirm that American women are postponing motherhood to pursue careers.

The national effects of our “lost generation” could be significant. The economic implications are most obvious: as public radio’s “Marketplace Morning Report” put it, “If you’re looking for a ‘Marketplace’ angle, just think about, oh, the labor force in 18 or 20 years.” One might also mention college student bodies and the armed forces.

But it’s not the numbers alone. What Brookings Institution demographer William Frey says of Europe—also in the death-grip of declining fecundity—could as easily apply to America: “[T]hey’re not going to share in the energy and vitality that comes with a younger population.” And what a powerful blow that would be to a nation like ours that prides itself on dynamism and the entrepreneurial spirit.

Inevitably, our low birth rate will raise calls for mass immigration to pick up the slack. Social Security is headed for its Waterloo as the base of its pyramid scheme narrows down. But immigration is no panacea. As London *Times* environment editor Anthony Browne has



MIKE KEEFE www.caglecartoons.com

written, immigrants age too. And the flow of immigrants required would be enormous, and constant.

The cultural question is pointed. While a small number of immigrants can, however imperfectly, be assimilated, a large number cannot. Even in America, the most efficient, and least disruptive, way to transmit our culture is to pass it on to our children. What we need, then, is clear: more American women to embrace maternity. The quandary is how to persuade them to do so.

[CULTURE]

EXPORTING ILLEGITIMACY

As the American birth rate continues to fall, the percentage of children born out of wedlock mounts inexorably. While the black illegitimacy rate has retreated to 68 percent, illegitimacy among whites and Hispanics continues to rise. The white rate is 23 percent, higher than the black rate four decades ago. The Hispanic out-of-wedlock rate is 43.4 percent and growing: the family life of new Latino immigrants is apparently assimilating to “urban” American norms.

University of Utah anthropologist Henry Harpending notes that father-

absent families yielded sons “with sharply reduced quantitative and spatial abilities ... who were more likely to divorce and, relative to controls, lacked drive and ambition.” Illegitimate daughters had “earlier and more sex and higher divorce rates.” Harpending concludes, “I don’t think high levels of fatherlessness are compatible with modern technological society for long.”

One might hope that statistics and observations like these would give rise to a certain modesty and caution amongst our “conservative” ruling elite, so sure that the world wants to be ruled by American norms.

[POSTWAR]

QUEUE UP FOR BAGHDAD

Only 56 percent of Americans think the Iraqi operation is going well, compared to 70 percent a month ago and 86 percent on May 7, according to a CNN/*USA Today*/Gallup poll. With casualty counts mounting and scenes of unrest fast replacing images of liberation, the imperial will seems to be flagging.

Enter Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.), his party’s ranking member on the Foreign Relations Committee. His answer to the

150,000 U.S. troops who thought the road home ran through Baghdad but now find themselves on occupation duty? Send in the French.

"I want to see French, German, I want to see Turkish patches on people's arms sitting on the street corners, standing there in Iraq," he thundered on "Fox News Sunday." "That's one way to communicate to the Iraqi people we are not there as occupiers."

What this sort of pronouncement—or patches for that matter—might communicate to the Iraqis is an open question. But what it communicates to (former) allies is the sort of arrogance that minimized membership in our "coalition of the willing." If our NATO partners doubted the wisdom of invasion, why would they click their heels to join in a souring occupation?

It would be advantageous to share the nation-building burden, but there's a problem filling the senator's order: in the run up to war, we told Old Europe we could do without its help. Asked about the likelihood of assistance in the aftermath, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently said that 70 countries "are queuing up." The Pentagon later revised that estimate down to 24 but declined to name them. Such is the reward of standing atop the world—alone.

[DIPLOMACY]

O LITTLE TOWN ...

To the ringing of church bells in Manger Square, Israeli soldiers withdrew early this month from Bethlehem, the second territory turned over to Palestinian security under the road map. Although the peace plan got off to a disconcertingly violent start, the Israeli withdrawal provides hope that it may yet be too soon to pronounce the road map dead. The day before, in fact, heard some of the most encouraging rhetoric yet. Said Ariel Sharon: "Even if we are required to make painful compromises, I will be

willing to make them for the sake of true peace—a peace for generations, the peace that we all yearn for."

Still, some Bethlehem Palestinians worry that the change over will be only symbolic. One, Jaudat Joude, told the AP, "If you want to make some serious changes, open the roads, remove the checkpoints and let people in [to Jerusalem] to work." His words reveal the reality behind the fanfare: a town still encircled by Israeli forces, with checkpoints regulating entry and exit. And Israel maintains plans to build a wall across a northern sector of town, through the property of some and cutting off that of others (including 60 Christian families) from their community.

A just peace in the Holy Land will indeed require "painful compromises," and not simply gestures of goodwill. Under the terms of the hand over, Palestinian police forces must prevent attacks on Israel by terrorists among their own constituents. Rightly so. But Israel too must do her part—not only continuing to pull back from Palestinian lands, but also granting the people true freedom: to come and to go, to earn a living, to build a society.

[NEOCONS]

GET A CLUE

To hear neoconservatives tell it, the term "neocon" itself is either (misleading) insider jargon used only by ideological rivals or, worse, a code word for "Jewish conservative." But the *New York Times*—which uses both "neoconservative" and "neocon" unselfconsciously in its political coverage—inadvertently refuted both myths on June 30. By running "neocon" as an answer (47-Down, six letters) in its Monday crossword puzzle—known to be the easiest of the week—the *Times* demonstrated that the word was well within the vocabulary of intelligent, mainstream readers. The clue? "Converted liberal, informally." ■

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BUCHANAN, CHIRAC & DEAN

As a somewhat left-of-center American, I'd spent several years thinking Pat Buchanan was wickedly intelligent, but our worldviews didn't quite match. I thought of him as just another partisan talking head amidst a sea of Left-Right bouts on cable and an occasional contender for the Republican presidential nomination. I thought the Reform Party run was ill-conceived and a waste of time and resources. Now, however, I wish Pat was again in the political realm.

Mr. Buchanan's points on the Iraq situation have been consistent and provocative. Time will tell who was right about the need for armed conflict, but for the present, it appears that Pat Buchanan, Jacques Chirac, Howard Dean, and Robert Novak have the upper hand even if they don't all subscribe to the same reasoning. Now we'll just have to see if the American public gives a damn. I'm guessing the neocons sure hope not. Thanks for speaking out and adhering to your principles—even if they aren't altogether congruent with mine.

RICHARD VINING

Atlanta, Ga.

ONE OUT OF THREE?

Pat Buchanan is for himself, he is not for the conservative cause. Anyone that raises questions about our Elected Conservative Government is not for the movement, only for himself. He has no evidence, just conjecture.

O.P. DITCH

via e-mail

NO ENDORSEMENT

I was dismayed by Robertson Morrow's essay on the decline of the dollar (July 14). While I agree with his forecast and concur that the decline should be welcomed, his prescription is appalling. His proposed restructuring of the military and manufacturing elite into the overseers of a dull revitalization is nothing

less than the managerial revolution of James Burnham. Morrow is smart enough to know that such a program would have the most limited popular appeal, though he is still delusional enough to think there to be a bright up-and-coming class of young Republicans. I would have resigned myself to thinking that the more likely scenario following the fall of the dollar would be some kind of new New Deal, but that appears to be precisely what Morrow has in mind.

JACK ROSS

Fairfax, Va.

The Editors respond:

We believe that Mr. Ross has misread Robertson Morrow's article and call his attention to the first paragraph on page 12. There Morrow writes, "One conceivable replacement for this false faith, and the one I favor, would be some root-canal Republicanism." Morrow later moots a revived military-industrial complex as another "conceivable replacement" but does not prescribe or endorse such an approach.

IF IT QUACKS ...

I just read John Laughland's piece on Michael Ledeen (June 30), and my reaction was more than a little peevish. I preface this by saying that I am vehemently opposed to the neocon agenda and am no friend to Ledeen's positions.

This article claims that in contrast to other neocons whose odyssey began with Trotskyism, Ledeen's began with a "fascination" with fascism, and it suggests that his development has been in the nature of reapplying those principles to the modern era. I take exception to the implication that the study of fascism demonstrates the political sympathies of the scholar. I was at Washington University when Ledeen taught there. At that time the German studies and intellectual history departments were blessed with a large number of German emigrés result-

ing in a heavy focus on the rise of fascism (and the corresponding failure of liberalism) in the inter-war period.

Nowhere in the article does Mr. Laughland make the case that Ledeen's study of fascism derived from a sympathy for it, or that his former "fascination" informs his current thinking. Perhaps a compelling argument could be made for the latter. I would love to see it.

SCOTT FULLERTON

Madison, Wis.

MUGGED BY REALITY

R.J. Stove (June 16) is certainly entitled to his assessment of Malcolm Muggeridge, bizarre as it is, but might I—as Muggeridge's first biographer and editor of two anthologies of his work—correct just a few factual errors? The errors begin, unpromisingly, with Stove's opening sentence; he asserts that Muggeridge died following "... years of Alzheimer's"; in fact Malcolm never had Alzheimer's although he did latterly suffer from some kind of senile dementia.

To call Richard Ingrams "humorless" is like calling the Pope "irreligious," but then I presume Stove has never met Ingrams. Likewise, to call Muggeridge "tall" is a literal and figurative stretch. (He was about 5' 7".)

"What, by 1950, had Muggeridge done?" asks Stove. Well, I count half a dozen books, woven into a career that included stints as University lecturer, foreign correspondent, and spy in MI5, but perhaps in Mr. Stove's action-packed life that counts for naught.

IAN HUNTER

Professor Emeritus

University of Western Ontario

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Was Poppy Right After All?

After five weeks of air strikes and 100 hours of ground war, President Bush ordered General Schwarzkopf to end his attacks and halt his advance. Receiving reports

of air massacres of retreating Iraqis on the Highway of Death out of Kuwait City, unwilling to risk a defection of his Arab allies, Bush I ordered an end to the war.

America agreed. Our goal had been to liberate Kuwait. It had been achieved, brilliantly. Saddam's army had been evicted. The 500,000-man army of Desert Storm was ordered home. And the neoconservatives never forgave Bush I for not going to Baghdad.

A dozen years later, the son, at their fanatical urging, invaded Iraq, seized Baghdad, and committed America to building a democracy that would serve as a model for the Arab and Islamic world.

Three months have now elapsed since Baghdad fell. In those 100 days, the wisdom of the father in disregarding the neocons, and the folly of the son in heeding them, have become apparent.

America has 150,000 troops bogged down in Iraq as proconsul Paul Bremer is demanding thousands more to put down a guerrilla revolt that has broken out against our occupation.

Each day brings reports of new American dead and wounded. Our enemies are said to be terrorists, Saddam's *Fedayeen*, the remnants of the Ba'ath Party. But Saddam had hundreds of thousands of men in his army, Republican Guard, and Special Republican Guard. We did not kill a tenth of these soldiers. Where are they now?

George W. Bush is in more trouble than he realizes. Indeed, his place in history may yet hinge on how he deals with

what Americans are coming to see as an intolerable cost in lives to maintain a presence in Iraq when they are not yet convinced it is vital to our security.

The president spent a year convincing us of the ominous threat of Saddam—his weapons and ties to terrorists—a threat that could be eliminated only by an invasion and the death of his regime. But he has not even begun to make the case for why we must stay on in Iraq.

Why are we still there? If our goal is a democracy in Iraq, that is surely noble, but is it doable? What is the price in blood of achieving it? What is the cost in tens of billions? What are the prospects for success? What would constitute indices of failure, at which point we would write off the investment? What is our exit strategy?

None of these questions has been answered. What we hear from the president is "Bring 'em on," and from senators who visit Baghdad, "We must be prepared to stay five or ten years." But why must we be prepared to stay five or ten years? Now that Saddam is gone and his weapons of mass destruction no longer threaten us, if ever they did, why must we stay?

Iraq is not Vietnam where we lost 150 soldiers each week for seven years. But it has taken on the aspect of the colonial wars of the European empires, all of which were lost because the natives were more willing to pay in blood to drive the imperialists out than the imperialists were willing to pay in blood to stay around.

The truism stands: the guerrillas win if they do not lose. And they do not lose as long as they keep fighting, dying, killing, and raising the cost of the occupation. British, French, Israelis, and Russians can testify to that.

Americans sense, rightly, that we do not need to occupy Iraq to be secure here at home.

Bush's father understood this. Is the son wiser? Why did Bush I stop at Basra and not go on to Baghdad? He had no desire to occupy and rule Iraq. He saw no need to. He feared that a U.S. occupation would alienate Arab allies, inflame the Arab street, and invite an Iraqi *intifada*. He placed a high value on the coalition he had stitched together to fight, and to pay for, the war. He was warned Iraq could split apart and a Shi'ite south sympathetic to Iran could break loose. He did not see a routed Saddam as a mortal threat. He believed Iraq could be deterred, contained.

On this, he was a conservative. Has not history proven him right?

His son, however—to invade and occupy Iraq and oust Saddam—was willing to shatter alliances, alienate Arabs, Turks, French, Germans, and Russians, have his country pay the full cost of the war, and run the entire occupation ourselves. Now, U.S. casualties, after the fall of Baghdad, are approaching the number of lives lost in the war.

Looking back, were Saddam's weapons so imminent a menace they required an invasion? Or did the neocons get revenge on the father by leading his son down the garden path—to the empire of their dreams, now creaking at the joints?

What does the son do now, with the election 15 months away? ■

[in the bedroom]

Sex & Consequences

An anthropologist vindicates the traditional family.

By Peter Wood

ANTHROPOLOGY—hometown to cultural relativists and all-night diner for disaffected intellectuals—may not be where you would most expect to find good reasons to defend traditional American family values. But anthropology, in fact, guards a treasure house of examples of what happens when a society institutionalizes *other* arrangements.

Want to know what it really means for a society to recognize “gay marriage”? Or for a society to permit polygamy? Or when the stigma on out-of-wedlock birth disappears? Care to know what happens to a human community that tolerates sexual experimentation among pre-adolescents and teenagers? Are fathers and mothers really interchangeable? Anthropology actually has a large amount of empirical evidence on all these matters—and many others that are now on the table in the United States thanks to various advocacy movements.

The Leftist political convictions of many of my fellow anthropologists tend to keep them silent about some of the scientific findings that have accumulated over 150 years or so of systematic

ethnographic study. But these findings strongly suggest that the family is a bedrock institution and that the kinds of modifications to the family advocated by gays, feminists, and others who speak in favor of relaxing traditional restrictions on sexual self-expression will have huge consequences.

Let's take an anthropologically informed look at two of these proposed changes to the family: gay marriage and polygamy.

Institutionalizing Male Homosexuality

It is not especially difficult to find examples of societies that are considerably more relaxed about male homosexual behavior than American society has been, at least until recently. Some societies such as pre-communist China and Vietnam officially disapproved of homosexuality while tolerating large numbers of male homosexual prostitutes. Today's boy prostitutes in Thailand carry on a trade that was remarked on by Western travelers of centuries past. A fair number of North American Indian societies made room for a homosexual “man-

woman” (a *berdache*, as the French fur traders called him) who dressed and acted the part of a woman. But the *berdache* was an exceptional creature and did not represent anything like normalized homosexuality.

For that, we have to look to Melanesia, where there are perhaps dozens of very small-scale societies in which male homosexuality is given ritual significance and fully incorporated into the life of the community. This happened for example in the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, and in many parts of New Guinea. Here is one example:

Among the Etoro, a tribe of about 400 living by hunting and small-scale gardening in the Stickland-Bosavi district of Papua New Guinea, from around age 12, every boy is “inseminated” orally more or less daily by a young man who is assigned to him as a partner. Late in his teenage years, an Etoro boy is formally initiated in an event involving many male sex partners, after which he becomes an “inseminator” rather than an “inseminee.” In due course, the former older male partner often marries the younger man's sister.



MARK BREWER

Somewhat similar customs are reported for many other tribes in the remote mountains of New Guinea, and these cases collectively serve as proof that it is not beyond human ingenuity to channel homosexual behavior into a social system. But what kind of social system? For the Etoro, it is one that radically discounts the value of women as mothers and wives. Etoro men defer marriage as long as possible and, when they do marry, are concerned mostly with the advantages to be gained from reinforced links with their male in-laws. The Etoro, as it happens, put significant obstacles in the way of heterosexual behavior. Husband and wife, for example, are permitted to have sexual relations only outside the communal household and only under conditions that rule out about two-thirds of the calendar year. The birth rate, unsurprisingly, is very low.

Does the behavior of a small tribe in New Guinea have any bearing on the debates in contemporary America about "respect" for homosexual lifestyles? Perhaps not. After all, *requiring* homosexual behavior is far from merely permitting it. But the Etoro and similar societies do illustrate something about the logic of homosexual male relations in human societies. When such relations are subject to cultural elaboration they almost always fit into a pattern of initiation into secrets, male exclusivity, and a low status for women.

Why this should be so is a complex question, involving both biology and the underlying nature of human society. A short answer is that heterosexual marriage is shaped by the complicated interplay of marital sex, pregnancy, child-care, and the sustained dependence and interdependence of husband, wife, and children. Male homosexual relations,

because they are sterile and because they channel relations of male dominance, are built on a narrower base of sex, subordination, and control.

Can it Work Here?

Vermont already has approved "civil unions," and as I write it looks very much as though the Massachusetts courts are about to give the United States some form of officially sanctioned "gay marriage." Many of its proponents say gay marriage is just the extension of a civil right to an unfairly excluded minority, and that liberal-minded argument sounds convincing to large numbers of Americans. I, however, am skeptical. The anthropological record, as I read it, shows that if a society treats male homosexual behavior as a fully legitimate option, it will end up *not* with a more expansively defined system

of marriage, but with a dual-track system in which "marriage" is reduced to a bare transactional relationship, while male homosexuality will flourish according to its own dynamic.

As a social scientist, I am perfectly prepared to admit that American society *can* normalize male homosexuality and that "gay marriage" moves us in that direction. Other societies have run this experiment, and, in a fashion, it "works." If America normalizes male homosexuality through gay marriage, our culture is not suddenly going to become exactly like the Etoro, or the Big Nambas of the northern New Hebrides, or other such tribes. Rather, we will follow out the biological and cultural logic of homosexuality in our own fashion. The general results, however, are predictable on the basis of the ethnography: heterosexual marriage will be weakened; the birth rate will decline; the status of women as mothers will further erode; and young boys will be a much greater target of erotic attention by older males.

To say these things, I understand, is to excite vigorous disagreement from those who advocate gay marriage as just a step in the proper expansion of civil

stubborn empirical fact that societies that have indeed institutionalized something akin to "gay marriage" have done so in the form of older men taking adolescent boys as their partners. To imagine that we could have gay marriage in the United States without also giving strong encouragement to this form of eroticism is, in light of the ethnographic evidence, wishful thinking.

In any case, the American experiment in "gay marriage" looks to me all but inevitable. We will see for ourselves in the next generation or two who is right.

Plural Marriage

The advocates of making America safe for plural marriage or polygamy are less visible than the advocates of gay marriage, but they certainly exist. A substantial percentage of Americans now believe that the government "has no business" enacting or enforcing laws on what adults do "in the privacy of their bedrooms," and those who believe this have already ceded that, in principle, polygamy is a legitimate option. What concern is it of the government whether a man has more than one wife or a

men and women in the family and between parents and children always have far-reaching social consequences.

In the United States, polygamy is illegal and relatively uncommon but nonetheless practiced by a few. The best-known examples are those 50,000 or so breakaway Mormons who reject the 1890 Mormon-Church edict that ended the practice of polygamy begun by their prophet Joseph Smith. Smith had cited biblical precedent and divine revelation for adopting polygamy, but the institution provided an expedient solution for a movement that initially attracted many more female converts than male. As the Mormons became a self-reproducing community in their own right, polygamy made less functional sense and continued only on the remote fringes of the movement.

Even so, Mormon polygamy follows a pattern thoroughly familiar to anthropologists. In societies where a man is permitted to have more than one wife, typically a minority of men actually do so; the members of that minority marry not just twice but several times; some of the co-wives are often sisters or cousins; the age difference between the husbands and wives is substantial and typically greater with each additional wife; and new wives are often teenagers. Polygamy (technically "polygyny" when it is a man with several wives) in other words is a system by which powerful older men assemble a household of young desirable women. Polygynous marriages almost always are part of a system of arranged marriages in which the women have little or no say about the matter.

That does not mean that the wives in a polygynous household are necessarily unhappy. For every Lu Ann Kingston, the Mormon woman who recently testified about being pressured at age 15 to become the fourth wife of her 23-year old cousin, there are many others who

WE ARE ALSO LEFT WITH THE **STUBBORN EMPIRICAL FACT** THAT SOCIETIES THAT HAVE INSTITUTIONALIZED "**GAY MARRIAGE**" HAVE DONE SO IN THE FORM OF **OLDER MEN TAKING ADOLESCENT BOYS** AS THEIR PARTNERS.

rights. The link between homosexual desire and erotic interest in children is especially contentious. Gay activists and their supporters frequently point out that most child molestation is perpetrated by heterosexual males. And they emphasize that homosexuality has no *necessary* link to pedophilia: a great many gay men are primarily interested in other adult gay men. I grant both points, but we are also left with the

woman more than one husband, provided that all the partners enter into the relationship of their own free will?

In this sense, polygamy is a good stand-in for the larger attitude that sexual relations and marriage are a "private" matter in which the larger community should have no say. That libertarian ideal applied to sexual relations is based on profoundly false assumptions about human societies. The relations between

accept the situation and take pleasure in the fellowship of their co-wives. Polygyny, in fact, is a perfectly workable way of arranging human affairs. But it has highly predictable consequences that most Americans would find unacceptable.

We probably don't want to embrace a system that shunts young girls into motherhood before they have an opportunity to get an education or that leads to fathers arranging the marriages of their teenage daughters.

But surely we are in no danger of heterodox Mormons imposing their system of polygyny on Methodists in New Hampshire or Baptists in Florida? No, we aren't. But polygyny has a brand-new set of apologists who have emerged all over the country in a little-heralded movement called "polyamory." The polyamorists might be thought of as a fetid blossom of the Swinging Sixties' free-love movement. They favor a redefinition of marriage as a combination of any number of men and women who join together in a kind of group family. Polyamorists expect and encourage sexual relations within this tangle to be both homosexual and heterosexual. And they are very far from any thought that their licentious groupings would provide an avenue for the emergence of a patriarch with a retinue of teen-wives.

But that just shows that the polyamorists are too busy groping toward their particular form of sexual self-expressions to understand the consequences of abolishing monogamy. Eliminate the one-man-one-wife rule and, yes, the polyamorists could openly do their thing but so could a lot of other people. Should the polyamorists have their way, plural marriage would, almost of a certainty, emerge in its classic form of rich older males dominating much younger vulnerable females.

This is not a "slippery slope" forecast. It is more definite than that, since we

know for a fact that everywhere and at every time human societies have made plural marriage an option, this is what happens. Given a free market and no rules against plural marriage, human beings will find themselves in a hierarchy dominated by older men with multiple younger wives.

But why? Why wouldn't the polyamorist utopia of coupling, tripling, and quadrupling emerge instead? Or at least

PERHAPS OUR EMPHASIS ON "**COMPANIONSHIP**" IN MARRIAGE AND THE IDEAL THAT SPOUSES LOVE ONE ANOTHER WOULD TAME THE **SPIRIT OF MALE DOMINATION** THAT POLYGAMY TYPICALLY UNLEASHES. **BUT I DOUBT IT.**

some tame version where most people are monogamists, but a fringe avails itself of the new option? The answer lies in something anthropologists don't like to talk about: human nature. The human sexes accommodate fairly easily to a dominant male hierarchy; human males are biologically primed to seek sexual variety; and the systems of reciprocity on which all human societies are based lend themselves very easily to dominant males consolidating their status by taking young wives.

There is a lot of argument in anthropology over these matters, and, for the moment, I would prefer to avoid a more strenuous attempt to explain why polygamy tends to crystallize in one particular form. What matters is that we have studied many hundreds of human societies, large and small, and in doing so have a pretty clear picture of polygamy as an institution. One version of polygamy, polyandry—the marriage of a woman with more than one husband—is very rare. (Various Himalayan tribes and the extinct culture of the Marquesan Islands in the Pacific provide examples.) But polygyny is common. Ask an anthropologist why and you are

bound to hear a lot about the numerous variations and particularities that distinguish one case from the next. But in the end you will still have this essential truth: polygamy is inseparable from older men imposing themselves on young women.

Nor do the consequences stop there. A society in which older men collect younger women creates a series of follow-on problems for itself in matters

such as dealing with a large number of youngish widows who missed getting an education and have few marketable skills; disputes over inheritance among the children of co-wives; and a large cohort of young men who find it much more difficult to find wives of their own. Young men competing for an artificially limited number of young women tend to be extra aggressive. Hence it is no surprise that polygynous societies are often violence-prone.

Would the United States be an exception? Possibly. Perhaps our emphasis on "companionship" in marriage and the ideal that spouses love one another would tame the spirit of male domination that polygamy typically unleashes. But I doubt it.

The Libertarian Illusion

Recently, Sen. Rick Santorum (R-Pa.) provoked an outcry when he observed, "If the Supreme Court says you have the right to consensual [gay] sex within your home, then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest, you have the right to adultery, you have the right to anything."

Among the replies posted on the Internet, I noted these:

- “Bigamy, polygamy, incest, and adultery—could you please tell me what, in a practical sense, is wrong with these from a ‘public policy’ point of view?”
- “What principled case can be made that any private-between-consenting-adults sexual expression *should* be off-limits?”
- “If all laws against consensual sex in the privacy of one’s home are unconstitutional or should be—which seems to be the position of Santorum’s critics—I can’t imagine why laws against adultery, incest, polygamy, and (possibly) bestiality should be spared from this sweeping claim.”

As the editorial page of the *New York Times* saw it, Santorum “equate[d] homosexuality with bigamy, polygamy, incest, and adultery.” Well, no, he didn’t *equate* these practices, but Senator Santorum

United States. It is true everywhere. Alter the rules of marriage, and society will reshape itself around the new situation. But it doesn’t necessarily reshape itself in the ways that the reformers hoped.

The sexual privatizers imagine a society in which adults can seek their pleasures without interference and somehow children will get born and properly raised. It is a sheer illusion. A society that doesn’t restrict human sexual relations in effective ways is a society that doesn’t have much interest in reproducing itself. People left to their own sexual whims will sometimes form stable families, but that is the exception, not the rule. The more we treat sex as merely recreational, the less important we make procreation. De-mystifying procreation—making it just another event that may or may not require heterosexual married parents in a long-term relationship—leads to both low procreation and badly raised children. A society that

demand, along with a revolution in attitudes towards pre-marital sex and cohabitation, and the de-stigmatizing of out-of-wedlock birth, divorce, pornography, and homosexuality have gone very far towards creating a popular view that we *can* create a society in which sexual behavior has no public consequences. But, in the end, this is merely a fantasy.

Forms of “sexual expression” are, at a deeper level, modalities of social relationships that do have very real public consequences. Whatever a society accepts as legitimate “in the bedroom” inevitably becomes a choice affecting the status of husbands, wives, children, and many others. In this sense, every society in effect chooses to have a strong version of marriage in which husbands and wives are bound by public expectations of good behavior or it chooses a weak version in which people work out their dissatisfactions and hurts in private and walk away from the marriage when they can’t. Likewise, a society chooses to respect women as mothers or treats them primarily as income-earners. It chooses to create families that invest love and attention in their children or alternatively to treat children as a luxury good. Society chooses whether children will be the focus of adult sexual interest; and it chooses whether it will cultivate families that care deeply about education or delegate the whole task to strangers, and so on. If we indulge the fantasy that “sexual expression” is only an individual matter of no valid concern to society at large, we choose our high rate of divorce, our ambiguous regard for motherhood, our unhappy children, and our poor schools. It doesn’t seem like an especially good choice.

Of course, you don’t really need an anthropologist to see that a breakdown in social rules governing marriage and the family has disastrous consequences. Consider some statistics: 1.35 million children in the U.S. born outside of mar-

THE DE-STIGMATIZING OF HOMOSEXUALITY HAS GONE FAR TOWARDS CREATING A POPULAR VIEW THAT WE CAN CREATE A SOCIETY IN WHICH SEXUAL BEHAVIOR HAS NO PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES. THIS IS FANTASY.

did enunciate a context for thinking about the broader implications of treating “sexual expression” as something that ought to be of no concern to society at large.

The anthropological evidence is overwhelmingly on the side of those who argue that large social consequences follow from a society’s decisions about which sexual practices are legitimate. The rules that govern marriage and sexual relations are, directly and indirectly, the basis of family life and have enormous influence over the formation of good (or bad) character in children. Marriage channels the primary relations between the sexes and the generations, and it is the template for most other relations in society. This is true not just in the

abandons the effort to restrict and channel human sexual urges into approved forms loses control of the strongest emotional/biological force known to our species and invites a progressive dissolution into unconnected or randomly connected individuals.

It is indeed possible to have a viable society that puts a very low value on women’s reproductive capacity. All the society really needs is a reliable way to attract new members. It can do that by raising children, or it can encourage high rates of immigration. Increasingly, it looks like we are choosing the latter.

The dream of unfettered sexual expression is very powerful. The advent of effective birth control and abortion on

riage in 2001—33.5 percent of the total; 947,384 divorces in 2000, excluding those in California, Colorado, Indiana, and Louisiana, states that don't count divorces; by age 14, 14-20 percent of American girls and 20-22 percent of American boys are "sexually experienced"; about five million Americans are addicted to drugs, and 52,000 die each year from their addictions; 15 million new cases of sexually transmitted diseases occur in the U.S. each year, a quarter of them among teenagers; about 100,000 American children engage in prostitution, and about 85 percent of street prostitutes report being incestuously molested by a male family-member as a child.

The breakdown in the family is also a sadly familiar part of everyday life for most us. Who doesn't know a single mom struggling to do her best for her children but inevitably coming up short? Who doesn't know of couples sundered by the small difficulties that, in previous generations, would have been taken in stride? And you don't need an anthropologist to sense the transformation of America from a family-friendly culture to a culture of me-first.

But if you want to see where these social trends are leading, anthropology has some answers. Humanity has been experimenting with ways to organize itself into viable social groups for many millennia. Almost any combination of sexual partners has been institutionalized somewhere and often in multiple places. We can and should read that record as a realistic check against the dreams of consequence-free sexual liberation that have seized the imaginations of so many of our fellow citizens. ■

Peter Wood is an Associate Professor of Anthropology at Boston University and the author of Diversity: The Invention of a Concept.

[another black and tan, please]

Irish Eyes Aren't Smiling On Iraq

Baghdad 2003, meet Belfast 1972.

By Martin Sieff

THE STEADY DRIP-DRIP effect of American casualties in Iraq continues. A couple of U.S. soldiers kidnapped and murdered here, six British soldiers obliterated in an ambush there. "No Go" areas in major cities where local religious leaders control everything. Carefully groomed leaders "acceptable" to the "imperial" power already sidelined and powerless. Vietnam? Perhaps. Although Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld confidently assures us it is not the case. "It isn't," he told a Pentagon briefing on June 30. "It's a different time. It's a different era. It's a different place."

Very true, Mr. Secretary. But not in the way you think. For I have been in this different place before, on a different continent, in a different time. For a parallel to Iraq 2003, think Ireland 1972.

What does this mean? That there is worse to come.

It was the shootings at the end of April that made the equation—and the contrast—clear. In two days of protests on April 28 and 30, U.S. troops killed 20 demonstrators in the central Iraqi city of Falluja. Not surprisingly, as journalist Jim Lobe wrote, "In the six weeks since the fatal demonstrations, al-Falluja, located about 35 miles west of Baghdad,

has become a major center of resistance to the U.S. occupation."

Falluja, mark you, is not Shi'ite, the sector in which our Pentagon strategists and their tame cheering section on the op-ed pages had warned us the Iranians might be able to stir up a little marginal, unrepresentative protest now and again. Nothing to worry about, as long as we kept our heads, as Dr. Krauthammer confidently as ever opined.

No. Falluja is Sunni Muslim, the very people who were supposed to be incapable of military effectiveness or sustained guerrilla action.

The Falluja shootings were adequately reported in the U.S. media. But there was no popular outrage, shock, or foreboding among the American public or their supposedly wise pundits about what was therefore bound to come. I, however, knew because I had seen it all before.

In January 1972, British Army units facing Irish Catholic nationalist protestors on the streets of Derry City, as provincial a town in Northern Ireland as Falluja is in Iraq, shot dead 13 of them. Not a single one, it transpired, was armed. Neither were the protestors in Falluja. Popular fury and protest erupted all over Ireland, north and south.

In the two years following Bloody Sunday, as it was instantaneously christened, the Provisional Irish Republican Army escalated its guerrilla war against the British Army in Northern Ireland and the province's own security forces from an occasional hit and run ambush or sniper killing, much as we are now already seeing in Iraq, to the most merciless, sustained terrorist onslaught experienced anywhere in Europe from the end of World War II in 1945 to the outbreak of the civil wars in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1991.

Fragmentation bombs were exploded in restaurants frequented by middle-class mothers doing their shopping. A napalm bomb was set off deliberately to incinerate the evening diners at a restaurant. False alarms were phoned in to the police to make sure several buildings were evacuated at the same time in order to assure that crowds of vulnerable people would be gathered where the real bomb was set to go off. And most appalling of all, the terrorists had, as Mao Zedong would have put it, a safe "civilian sea" to swim in, a local population radicalized by previous events—most especially Bloody Sunday—within which they could hide and operate.

The parallels with Iraq today following the shootings in Falluja are obvious. But the grim point that needs to be made is that the situation the U.S. Army now confronts in the Land of the Two Rivers as a result of the reckless policy of conquest wrapped as "liberation" is now far, far worse.

THE TERRORISTS HAD A SAFE "CIVILIAN SEA" TO SWIM IN, A LOCAL POPULATION RADICALIZED BY PREVIOUS EVENTS—MOST ESPECIALLY BLOODY SUNDAY—WITHIN WHICH THEY COULD HIDE AND OPERATE.

The Provisional IRA, or "Provo," guerrillas in Northern Ireland could count on the active support of only a small fraction of a minority Catholic Irish nationalist community totaling half a million people, one-third of the total population. The anti-American guerrillas already starting to operate in Iraq can count on the effective support, thanks to the Pentagon's bungled occupation policies in the past three months alone, of most of the 60 percent Shi'ite majority of the Iraqi population of 25 million, and similar proportions in the Sunni heartland of central Iraq where Ba'ath regime support was always concentrated.

Northern Ireland covers an area a fraction the size of New Jersey. Iraq is as big as California. The IRA could only count on limited amounts of weapons being smuggled in from across the border in the Irish Republic. The democratically elected Irish governments of the time under Jack Lynch and Liam Cosgrave were friendly to Britain and in no way encouraged the Northern Irish guerrillas. By contrast, Iraq has a long common frontier with Iran, helpfully defined by President George W. Bush as being second to Iraq in the "axis of evil." Closing that border, with the number of troops we have in Iraq, is simply impossible. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul

Wolfowitz, it will be recalled, hung Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki out to dry for warning that effective occupation of Iraq would take several hundred thousand U.S. troops. Yet even Wolfowitz has now admitted, under questioning by U.S. senators led by Joe Biden (D-Del.), that up to 200,000 American

soldiers may be necessary. Indeed they may. Or more.

Northern Ireland was not a sudden acquisition or conquest by Britain. It had been part of the United Kingdom for 370 years, since the Protestant settlement early in the reign of King James I after the crushing of Catholic Irish Earl Hugh O'Neill. It was not halfway around the world, as Iraq is. It was—and is—populated by mainstream Protestants and Catholics, not Muslims—let alone Muslims susceptible to a revolutionary radicalization of their faith in reaction to continued U.S. occupation. It had many serious local political leaders in both the Protestant and Catholic communities ready to repudiate paramilitary terrorism and to seek to work together for the common good. None of these factors exists for us in Iraq.

Yet the Northern Irish Troubles that began in August 1969 and flared to atrocity-level in response to a degree of violence comparable to what we have already inadvertently inflicted in Falluja, lasted 29 years until the Good Friday Peace Agreement of 1998. By then, 3,600 people had been killed. Small, by 20th century bloodbath standards, admittedly. Indeed, what British Home Secretary Reginald Maudling memorably called "an acceptable level of violence" in the

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early 1970s. But even that "acceptable level" if proportionately inflicted in Iraq, would cause at least 60,000 deaths, at least 10,000 of them U.S. soldiers. How "acceptable" will the American people find that?

I was just a teenage kid on the streets of Belfast when it all started in August 1969. I saw with my own eyes local people in the Catholic streets around the Falls Road welcome British soldiers as liberators who had saved them from being burned out by Protestant mobs. Yet within 18 months, people from that community were shooting at those same soldiers, and shooting to kill. We have already reached that point in Iraq after only three months.

Secretary Rumsfeld is already trying to set his latest agitprop agenda. "It isn't" Vietnam, he says. But what, then, is it? It is a place where the Pentagon itself admits that 65 American soldiers were killed or died, supposedly in accidents, in the two months of May and June alone, a death rate already of more than one a day. The deaths and killings started right after President Bush announced the end of major combat operations on May 1.

I stick by what I wrote for United Press International in an analysis published on that same May 1. The Falluja clashes were, I maintained, "a proof that the pre-Saddam dynamics of Iraqi society have already asserted themselves and that the U.S. Army and the American people will rapidly become the subjects of Iraqi popular wrath. [A] vivid phrase of Thomas Jefferson's sums up this new dire state of affairs: The United States has seized a wolf by the ears in Iraq. And now it dare not let it go."

America's Vietnam? Too soon to say it isn't. America's Northern Ireland? Quite definitely. Only already far, far worse. ■

Martin Sieff is Chief International Analyst for United Press International.

How Dean Could Win

The Vermont governor would do well to make immigration reform a Democratic issue.

By Scott McConnell

HOWARD DEAN'S REMARKABLE fundraising surge, his unusual ability simultaneously to galvanize liberals, intrigue non-liberals, and say "no" to core Democratic constituencies without alienating them renders him the odds-on favorite to win the Democratic nomination. The Democratic Party's Washington establishment is already uncomfortable with him, leaking anonymous quotes about an Election-Day debacle that would cost the party its foothold in Congress. But these folks (or their political forebears) opposed George McGovern and Jimmy Carter as well. They don't have a strong candidate to put up against Dean: even back when the formidable Hubert Humphrey or Scoop Jackson would rush into the breach to ward off an outsider or antiwar insurgent, it didn't do the trick.

But if it is now more than plausible that Dean will emerge from the bottom half of the draw, is there any reason to think that the former Vermont governor won't be ground to bits by George W. Bush in the final? McGovern won only his native South Dakota and the District of Columbia against Nixon; Mondale fared no better against Reagan. Michael Dukakis never figured out what hit him when the first George Bush began to paint him as an effete liberal New Englander, and George W. Bush has bonded with Middle America far more than his dad ever did. You can understand why the Democratic establishment is nervous.

It is unlikely that being right from the start about Bush's invasion of Iraq will carry any Democrat to the White House. Support for the war has dropped from 80 percent to 56 percent in the three months since the famous victory, but it may not drop farther. Much of the American electorate will always support the president when there are troops in the field and not welcome questions about how they got there. A candidate like Dean will have the antiwar vote, the traditional Democratic constituencies of blacks, most Hispanics, and labor. He will do well with gays (like Jews, a fundraising constituency more than a decisive voting bloc) and with well-educated wine-and-cheese liberals, and he has done an extraordinary job of mobilizing young people getting involved in politics for the first time. But this may not be enough to beat a sitting president unless the economy is thoroughly in the tank.

Dean's weakness is the weakness of every Democrat in the last 30 years—a tepid appeal to working- and middle-class white voters, especially males, especially in the South and border-states. The Vermonter has acknowledged the need to "get white males to vote Democratic again," but federal health insurance and balanced budgets, which he brings up when the question is raised, won't do it. What could?

The obvious choice is immigration. As the issue first began to simmer in the early 1990s, in the aftermath of the LA

riots, *LA Times* editorial writer Jack Miles wrote a seminal piece in the *Atlantic Monthly* suggesting that while the immigration issue had begun to percolate on the Right—as an issue of cultural cohesion—it would eventually be seized upon by the Left, as a labor and fairness issue.

during the past generation to new immigrants. But white workers are getting hurt as well. In a phenomenon noted by Brookings Institution demographer William Frey, the white working class has been steadily fleeing high-immigration states during the last 15 years—from California to Nevada and Colorado, from

ness interests and ethnic lobbies. The economy was booming then, however, and hardly anyone was out of work. The vote would probably be different today. Why couldn't a Democrat like Dean seize the "vital center" of the immigration debate, embrace the Jordan proposals, and outflank Bush as a protector of American culture, prepared to enforce American laws and preserve the rights and living standards of working-class Americans? Answer: he could.

The immigration issue is the weak link in George Bush's hold over his bedrock white-male constituency. The president has refused to join the battle against affirmative action—a policy that discriminates against white men and their children. While there may be a moral and practical case for some form of affirmative action for the descendants of blacks brought here in slavery, the Supreme Court "diversity" decision has probably ensured that preferences will flow to a variety of other groups, including recent immigrants, long into the future. The case for a reduced immigration flow and strict enforcement of America's laws is explicitly a case for making sure America's labor markets do not soon resemble those of Mexico and Brazil. But it is implicitly a case against the United States becoming a nation riven by divisive arguments over affirmative action and ethnic quotas, as the groups with a stake in such programs expand inexorably. America is a diverse nation already and will always remain so: it hardly needs an infinitely growing pool of impoverished workers to prove the point.

How might this play out in electoral practice? Addressing immigration would certainly help any Democrat in New Mexico and Arizona, whose primaries follow right upon New Hampshire's, and in Tennessee, a border-state with a growing illegal-alien problem. Would it alienate left-wing supporters? Perhaps some—especially that segment of the

IF YOU ARE THE SORT OF PERSON WHO WISHES TO HIRE SOMEONE CHEAP TO CLEAN YOUR POOL, YOU ARE PROBABLY SOMEONE WHO BENEFITS FROM A LARGE RESERVE ARMY OF POOR AND EAGER WORKERS.

Miles's prediction proved half right. He was correct in pointing out that immigration transcended standard Left-Right categories. He noted that much of the "free market" business community more or less favored open borders—the *Wall Street Journal* editorial page being the most important public example. And it's not as if high immigration rates are without negative consequences for Democratic constituencies. As George Borjas and other immigration economists have argued, while some immigrants do benefit the overall economy, a large coterie of low-skilled workers has costs, and those costs are borne disproportionately by less-skilled and lower-paid American workers. If you are the sort of person who wishes to hire someone cheap to clean your pool, you are probably someone who benefits from a large reserve army of poor and eager workers. If you are struggling to support a family with the skills of a high-school graduate, you will benefit from a tighter labor market and higher wages that would stem from a lower rate of immigration.

Miles maintained that the first winners from immigration reform would be the black workers—a group that has lost many niches in the American economy

New York to the Southeast. But the immigration surge has kept pursuing them, five or ten years behind, and is now beginning to have a notable impact on labor markets in the interior of the country. In a bellwether case, Tyson Foods, the meat- and poultry-processing giant, recently was charged in a federal indictment with conspiracy to transport illegal aliens from Mexico to Tennessee in order to lower its wages. The company defended itself by arguing that executives "acting on their own" were responsible for importing an illegal work force. But the fact is that a pool of illegals kept wages at essentially sub-American rates throughout the 1990s.

Any Democrat interested in raising the immigration issue has a good precedent and ready-made vocabulary. In 1995, the bipartisan federal advisory Commission on Immigration Reform headed by Barbara Jordan, the first black member of Congress elected in Texas, recommended cutting the legal immigration rate by about one-third and sharply stepping up enforcement against illegal aliens. President Clinton initially endorsed her proposals, but legislation based on her commission's recommendations was defeated in the House after a massive Left-Right lobbying campaign by open-borders busi-

radical Left that sees immigration as a tool to eradicate “white hegemony” or whatever their term of art for traditional America is. Dean doesn’t need their support.

But Dean’s problem isn’t with Democratic primary voters. It’s with white males, especially those who objectively might back him for economic reasons. Embracing immigration as an issue will give him a ready answer when the latter-day Lee Atwaters get to work “defining” him. How much will George W. Bush want to talk about the amnesty plan he was hatching with Vicente Fox—shelved for the moment after 9/11—but still part of the Bush agenda? How much will Bush want to talk about the weak border enforcement prior to 9/11?

Embracing immigration reform would make good practical politics. But would Howard Dean be willing to consider such arguments, or is he too reflexively liberal? The record is unclear. Dean has made many standard PC statements about immigration helping the economy (partially true, partially false) and the wonders of diversity. Modern-day progressives aren’t supposed to care about the nation’s borders.

But it’s not clear what Dean’s actual political coloring is. The left-wing press finds his record in Vermont dismayingly moderate. A not uncommon assessment is that he’s basically a Rockefeller Republican. He seems clearly descended from a New England progressive WASP tradition, prudently internationalist in foreign affairs, a vigorous supporter of equal rights for blacks, a strong environmentalist—part of the political culture that has spread from New England across to Wisconsin and Minnesota and the Pacific Northwest—a good-government kind of progressivism. This is a political heritage that has embraced—even led—immigration reform movements before in American history. It could well again. ■

[opiate of the masses]

Warlords & Druglords

Who’s minding the drug war?

By Arnaud de Borchgrave

EUROPE, FROM FRANCE TO RUSSIA, Central Asia—including all the former Soviet Muslim republics—the Middle East, and South Asia are awash in Afghan heroin. The 13 warlords who now control Afghanistan have divvied up the moolah from a bumper crop of some 5,000 tons of opium that generates almost \$100 million a year.

Opium becomes heroin in purification labs in neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Eastern Europe. Street value at the final points of sale is several billion dollars. Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai’s writ does not extend much beyond Kabul. His directives to the warlord-governors are promptly ignored. International Security Assistance Force troops are confined to the capital, and U.S. Special Forces are too busy chasing Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives who have re-infiltrated from Pakistan to worry about warlords feeding expensive drug habits in other parts of the world.

Under the medieval Taliban regime of flat-earth clerics, an Afghan family in opium-poppy cultivation averaged \$750 a year. For its first four years in power, the Taliban used the poppy to buy the allegiance of warlords and fund its own activities as well as al-Qaeda’s. It sud-

denly banned all poppy cultivation in 2000. Warehouses were full, and the price was dropping. UN inspectors confirmed that poppy fields lay fallow and somewhat naïvely concluded the Taliban were responding to international pressure. This didn’t seem to work when the Taliban decided to blow up giant statues of Buddha at Bamiyan, which they denounced as idolatry.

Today, that same poppy-farming family is averaging \$6,500 *per annum*. What the Kabul regime is now offering farmers to abandon drugs and substitute other crops is a fraction of what they’re making. Karzai doesn’t have the resources to improve the payment. All donor nations have fallen far short of the \$5 billion in pledges made in the wake of the Taliban’s defeat. In fact, inter-city highways are yet to be rebuilt; a normal six-hour trip can take three days.

A ranking Afghan official, speaking privately, said, “The drug trafficking has corrupted everything in today’s Afghanistan, from the central Transitional Authority in Kabul to the warlords who really run the country. There is only one way to prevent Afghanistan from dying again: America must depose the war-

lords, and launch a massive, well-funded, crop-substitution campaign."

Britain has taken on the assignment of co-ordinating international counter-narcotics programs in Afghanistan. The objective is to cut back opium production by 70 percent by 2008 with a view to total eradication by 2013. To make this remotely possible, an estimated \$384 million would have to be earmarked for crop substitution. This does not include any enforcement mechanism, such as multinational UN heroin police.

Apart from its ravenous appetite for injectable-quality heroin, Europe also appears to be emulating America's cocaine habits. Illegal narcotics trafficking from Colombia now satisfies the needs of both continents.

Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom and the global manhunt for al-Qaeda terrorists have clearly hurt the U.S. war on drugs in Latin America. Coca production is rising in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Eradication in Colombia does not appear to be working. No sooner is one plantation blasted from the air with chemical sprays than another piece of land is cleared and a new crop planted.

Colombia's Marxist guerrilla groups—FARC and ELN—and the right-wing paramilitaries are deeply involved in narcotics trafficking, from production to protection. If eradication were working, the street price in the U.S. and Europe would be spiking.

For years, U.S. administrations be-

lieved that effective elimination of coca growing was a prerequisite to defeating the FARC. Now the Bush administration has it right—the defeat of FARC comes first.

In Bolivia, coca growers have become a major political force. The leader of coca farmers, Evo Morales, came within half a length of winning last year's race for the presidency. He is now garnering support in non-coca regions. The coca planters have come together under the banner of an anti-United-States, neo-Marxist nationalist ideology that rejects free markets.

The Peruvian government has also backed down from advocating coca eradication. The Brazilian government is looking for political and business leaders, narco-traffickers, and terrorists who have laundered some \$30 billion in ill-gotten gains. Much of this staggering amount came from Brazil's border with Paraguay and Argentina, the tri-border area the CIA says funds terrorist activities.

Washington's anti-drug policies are in serious trouble from Afghanistan to Bolivia to Colombia (the ABC countries). Terrorism and embryonic guerrilla warfare in Iraq and the need to recruit two to three divisions from reluctant allied and friendly countries to share the Iraqi policing duties have not drained the administration's energies. But no one wants to raise another crisis that might detract from the present focus and add more red ink to the federal budget.

What is happening—or rather not happening—in A, B, and C should be put into a global context for the president's morning intelligence briefing. Bush understands it's a global contest. But some dots have to be connected. ■

Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large of United Press International.

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The GOP's New Deal

Big tent, big government, big mistake

By Timothy P. Carney

IN THE NAME OF "Compassionate Conservatism," the Bush administration is now pressing the Republican-controlled Congress to create the largest new government program in 40 years—a prescription-drug entitlement that will cost an estimated \$400 billion over five years. This is only the latest of President George W. Bush's massive additions to the federal government, and the costs will be political as well as fiscal.

Bush's advocacy of increased spending on government schools and federal education programs, efforts to ameliorate AIDS in Africa, and the mendacity of tax "rebates" for those who pay no income tax (honest men call this scheme "income redistribution") has some advocates of limited government complaining that the president is sacrificing conservative principles for political expediency. But this understates the hazards of the administration's profligacy. While Bush's largesse arguably aids his re-election efforts, the long-term political costs for the Grand Old Party will rival the fiscal and economic costs of our 43rd president's compassion.

The starting point of this summer's Medicare prescription-drug debate should cause concern for Republicans with any political memory. The drug bill that hit the Senate floor was the offspring of a deal between President Bush and Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), the "liberal lion" of the U.S. Senate. This seems an odd partner for a Republican president to choose. Kennedy, after all, is the most straightforward advocate in Washington of a universal health-care system man-

dated and funded by the federal government. Bush and the Republican Party believe this would be a disaster.

But the White House appears to believe that it can get political mileage out of Rose-Garden signing ceremonies with Ted Kennedy in attendance. We've seen this play before, with Bush's premiere policy initiative: the "No Child Left Behind Act."

In the eyes of conservative education reformers, policy-wise, this bill started off as a bad one with some good elements and ended up a disaster. From a fiscal perspective, it was a disaster from the start. Politically, it was no better. But Bush had campaigned as "The Education President," and he needed a bill to live up to that reputation. Congressional Republicans gave his education bill a top spot on the agenda, with the bills in the two chambers garnering the numbers H.R. 1 and S.1 in the 107th Congress. (In the 108th Congress, those numbers adorn the prescription-drug bills.)

In the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, liberal Democrat George Miller (Calif.), the ranking member, effectively took control of the bill markup. This shouldn't have been surprising—drafting a bill on expanding the federal role in education is moving the ball onto the Democrats' turf. The committee, effectively under Democratic control, stripped out Bush's school-choice provisions, added to the costs, and passed it with a five-year cost of \$132 billion. It grew to \$135 billion before Capitol Hill was done.

On Jan. 8, 2002, Bush signed his prized

education bill into law with a grinning Kennedy and Miller over his right shoulder. A week later, at a rally in Boston, Bush said, "I told the folks at a coffee shop in Crawford, Texas that Ted Kennedy was all right. They nearly fell out." Those shocked folks at the Crawford diner very likely had their suspicions confirmed just a few weeks later, when Kennedy and Miller launched an attack on Bush for not providing even *more* money in his education budget. "The President's budget deals a severe blow to our nation's schools," Kennedy said in a March press release.

In October, as the midterm elections approached, Kennedy smacked around Bush and the GOP a little more. "Today, the President and the Republican leaders in Congress are cutting funding for our schools," Kennedy said. Since Republicans took over Congress, Department of Education funding has risen by 132 percent. The White House seems to hope it can feed the liberal lion to keep him quiet. The story of the education bill should have shown that Republicans can never spend enough to satisfy Kennedy or even to keep him from attacking them.

The attempt to disarm the Left by co-opting their issues fails in the end. The Left can move infinitely to the Left—and it does. Sure enough, Kennedy has called this massive new drug entitlement "a down-payment"—presumably on increasingly socialized health care.

Virginia Sen. George Allen, chairman of the National Republican Senatorial Committee, was gloating last week that GOP passage of the drug plan would help Republicans in the 2004 Senate elections. Passing the new entitlement "shows Republicans in leadership, taking action that is actually going to have a positive

aspect in people's lives," Allen told the *Hill* newspaper. "It'll be something tangible that people, when they go vote in '04, will say, 'Republicans got this done.'"

But bringing up liberal legislation puts conservative lawmakers in a dilemma. They either need to betray their president and invite attacks of extremism ("he's too far right for the president"), or betray their principles. Conservative Senators faced a stark example of this dilemma in June, in the aftermath of Bush's tax cut. Liberals in the media and on the *Hill* raised a cry about the families "left out" of the child tax credit expansion—that is, those with no income-tax liability would not benefit from immediately raising the credit from \$600 per child to \$1000.

Sen. Blanche Lincoln (D-Ark.) brought up a bill to extend the "tax credit" to those "left out." This is manifestly not a tax-cut question but a question of converting the IRS into a welfare agency. Almost all Republicans in Washington understood this was bad policy on many levels. But when White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer was asked about it, he instructed the Republicans in Congress, "Pass it!" President Bush issued a statement to same effect.

The bill the Senate passed would cost \$10 billion, effectively involve the IRS in handing out welfare checks, and further complicate the tax code. But Republicans did not want to repudiate their president or appear outside the mainstream.

Oklahoma's two senators, however, refused to go along. Don Nickles (R) and Jim Inhofe (R) cast the two lonely "no" votes on the bill. Accordingly, they got abused in letters to the editor and on radio shows for casting a vote "against the poor." The *Tulsa World* led off an article a couple of days later with a quote from state Democratic Chairman Jay Parmley: "Our senators have said tax cuts will spur the economy. But the only spurs I've seen are on the back of

Don Nickles' and Jim Inhofe's boots as they stick it to working families." The White House handed Parmley and Oklahoma's Democrats this line of attack by pushing a bill they saw as bad policy but good politics. Inhofe and Nickles probably disagree on the politics part.

Mitigating the harm of their dilemma, neither of the Sooner senators faces a tough re-election bid. Unfortunately, Jim DeMint (R-S.C.) and Richard Burr (R-N.C.)—who oppose the Medicare bill in the House—don't have that sort of political safety. DeMint is running to oust Sen. Ernest Hollings (D) or replace him if he should retire. Burr is trying to take Sen. John Edwards's (D) seat. Both races will be tough. DeMint and Burr could not swallow the pragmatic arguments Majority Leader Tom DeLay (Texas) tried to feed them. Burr repelled an overture by White House Chief of Staff Andy Card, and Karl Rove couldn't win DeMint over to the House bill. So both

process of weaning farmers off subsidies. The 2002 "Farm Security Act" has an estimated five-year cost of \$40 billion. Bringing farmers back onto the dole shrinks the constituency for limited government and tax cuts. Public employees have always opposed tax cuts for the same reason an AT&T employee wouldn't want to see his firm's revenues drop. When farmers' revenue comes increasingly from the U.S. Department of Agriculture compared to actual consumers, they nearly become government workers.

The education bill shows that attempts to appease the Left are futile because its appetite for spending is boundless. It ignores history and common sense to expect the likes of Ted Kennedy and John Edwards to play nice come election time because Bush gave the Left some of what it wanted.

The tax credit "fix" demonstrates that political gain from policy mistakes only

THE EDUCATION BILL SHOWS THAT ATTEMPTS TO APPEASE THE LEFT ARE FUTILE BECAUSE ITS APPETITE FOR SPENDING IS BOUNDLESS.

men cast "no" votes, positioning themselves to the right of DeLay and allowing their Democratic opponents to attack them for hating seniors.

Not only does the prescription drug issue—by harming two promising Southern candidates—make it harder for the GOP to hold onto its majority, it makes a GOP majority less meaningful to conservatives. The more the White House forces uncomfortable votes like this, the less conservatives like Burr and DeMint are attracted to running for Senate. Fewer Burrs and DeMints means more Lincoln Chafees and Arlen Specters.

Bush in 2001 and 2002 supported Congress's reversal of the 1996 "Freedom to Farm Act," which began the

goes to those who sell out their principles. Pushing bad bills on the GOP crowds out the conservatives—who support the tax cuts and conservative judges Bush wants.

Increased farm subsidies are a good example of how bad policy can increase the constituency for the welfare state and hence the Democratic Party.

The president's compassion may help him win a second term, but it will only make the Democrats demand more and more from the GOP. If Bush keeps increasing the size of this big tent, it will soon come crashing down on itself. ■

Timothy P. Carney is a reporter for the Evans-Novak Political Report.

The WMD Farrago

The Bush administration's rationale for war has collapsed with a thud heard round the world.

By Eric S. Margolis

A PLUCKY IRAQI SHEPHERD has launched a \$300 million suit against the U.S. government for killing 17 of his relatives and 20 of his sheep. What, one wonders, would happen if Saddam hired Johnnie Cochran and launched a class action suit on behalf of all Iraqis against the U.S. for conspiracy to commit aggression, slander, libel, \$250 billion in property damages, the death of thousands of its citizens and soldiers, theft of oil and national bank funds, and so on?

After all, if Germany had to pay war reparations to the nations it occupied during World War II, why can't Iraq sue for an invasion, billed as a pre-emptive attack of self-defense, that violated the UN Charter and international law, inflicted massive destruction and social chaos, and was based on faked information?

The high-minded moral crusade against Iraq has turned into a tawdry scandal. The circumstantial house of cards justifying an unprovoked war against Iraq has collapsed with a thud heard round the world.

Each week brings embarrassing new revelations that Washington's and London's "conclusive evidence" of the urgent dangers posed by Iraq was either fraudulent or absurdly exaggerated. Saddam Hussein's nefarious weapons of mass destruction and his purported links to al-Qaeda—the *casus belli* for the invasion of Iraq—were canards.

Intelligence officials in the U.S. and

Britain say there was no "urgent threat" against America, as President Bush repeated; nor any capability by Iraq to strike Britain "within 45-minutes," the claims used to stampede fearful Americans and Britons to war. The war's chief architect, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, now lamely explains such lurid claims were made for "bureaucratic" harmony.

Call the roll on the administration's claims:

- Iraq's "drones of death" that President Bush warned might be launched from lurking Iraqi vessels in the Atlantic, then shower fiendish germs on sleeping America, turned out to be two rickety model airplanes.
- There were no Scuds carrying bio-warfare warheads. Aluminum tubes for "uranium enrichment" turned out to be for 9.6-mile-range conventional artillery rockets. In a farce worthy of "Ernest Goes to Iraq," so-called evidence of covert uranium shipments from Niger to Iraq cited by Bush in his State of the Union address was exposed as a crude forgery well known to the U.S. national security establishment long before the president's speech.
- The supposedly damning photos of Iraqi "decontamination vehicles" showed by Secretary Colin Powell in his UN show trial against Baghdad as proof positive of the Iraqi world

threat, turned out, on inspection, to be fire trucks.

- "Chemical munitions" bunkers were empty. Iraq's notorious "mobile bio-weapons labs" were for inflating weather balloons for Iraqi artillery—and were supplied by Britain. CIA officials leaked that senior al-Qaeda prisoners flatly denied any links to Iraq.

If the Bush administration truly believed its claims about Iraq, then the U.S. has suffered another massive intelligence failure every bit as grave as its catastrophic failure on 9/11. The Iraq weapons fiasco, in the words of Rep. Jane Harmon (D-Calif.), the ranking member on the House Intelligence Committee, could be "the greatest intelligence hoax of all time."

So-called weapons of mass destruction may yet turn up in Iraq, or be planted there. After all, the U.S., Britain, and Europe supplied Iraq with a cornucopia of chemical and biological weapons in the 1980s for use against Iran. But a few rusty shells filled with mustard gas, some phials of stale-dated anthrax, or yellowed documents, will not corroborate White House claims that Iraq posed an imminent and deadly threat to America and the world.

To justify this apocalyptic allegation, U.S. forces will have to uncover underground installations worthy of a James-Bond villain, complete with long-range ICBMs carrying nuclear or biological

warheads with aerosol dispensing systems.

In actuality, neither poison gas nor germs are true weapons of mass destruction; only high-yield nuclear weapons fit that emotionally charged description. Poison gas is a battlefield weapon that is inefficient, undependable, and difficult to employ. At Verdun, in 1916, the Germans fired one million poison gas shells at French troops along a four-kilometer sector. The French had no gas masks but held. The Soviets used poison gas and toxins in Afghanistan yet lost the war.

Biological weapons, such as anthrax, plague, and Q-fever are, in theory, more deadly. But their use requires cumbersome equipment and highly specialized technicians. Delivering toxins beyond artillery range requires aircraft or missiles with complex aerosol dispensing systems. Most toxins have a limited shelf life from days to three years.

Iraq had a primitive nuclear program in the mid-1980s run by a cadre of some 2,500 nuclear scientists and technicians. Efforts were made to enrich uranium by centrifuges and electromagnetic separa-

its ally Israel, in exchange for yellowcake uranium ore that the Israelis used to produce their own nuclear weapons. Israel's nuclear technology came initially from France, then, later, via espionage and diversion, from the United States.

Iraq's rudimentary nuclear program, created to counter Israel's large nuclear arsenal and to menace Iran, was eradicated by U.S. attacks 1991 and by post-war UN inspectors. Crushing U.S. sanctions and UN inspections made any renewed nuclear effort impossible. But even if Iraq had been left alone to develop a new nuclear weapons program, it would have required at least a decade to produce one or two crude nuclear devices that would have been too heavy to be carried atop a missile. Claims that Iraq was "only six months away from producing a nuclear weapon" in 1991 were totally false.

Even if Iraq had possessed medium-range, nuclear-armed missiles, such weapons would have threatened only Israel, not the United States. This remote challenge to Israel, and preserving Israel's Mideast monopoly on weapons of

Yes, Saddam was a bloody tyrant, as this writer, whom the Iraqi secret police threatened to hang, knows firsthand. But the Bush administration's latest excuse for war ignores the fact that the United States and Britain were accomplices in many of Saddam's crimes.

During the 1970s, the U.S., Israel, and Iran armed Iraq's Kurds and stirred them to revolt. During the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, Kurds and Shi'ites again revolted against Baghdad just as Iranian forces were driving into Iraq. Saddam crushed the revolts, in some cases using mustard gas. At the time, the U.S. and Britain were secretly allied to Iraq, covertly supplying Saddam's forces with intelligence data, heavy weapons, and financial support. Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs were entirely supplied by the U.S., Britain, Germany, and Italy. British technicians, seconded by the Ministry of Defense and MI6, were producing anthrax and botulism for Iraq. The U.S. government remained silent about Saddam's killing of Kurdish and Shi'ite insurgents and his use of chemical weapons against Iran.

At the end of the 1991 Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush called on Iraq's Kurds and Shi'ites to rebel. When they did, U.S. forces impassively watched them be massacred by Saddam's troops. One was reminded of Stalin's encircling Red Army watching the Germans crush the Warsaw uprising. In both cases, potential troublemakers—pro-Iranian Shi'ite militants, Polish nationalists—were conveniently destroyed.

Now, the Bush administration is employing the same fronts that were so successful against Iraq to whip up war fever against Iran. Why tamper with a winning formula? ■

Eric S. Margolis is the author of War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan and Asia and a columnist, commentator, and war correspondent.

TO JUSTIFY THIS APOCALYPTIC ALLEGATION, U.S. FORCES WILL HAVE TO UNCOVER UNDERGROUND INSTALLATIONS WORTHY OF A JAMES-BOND VILLAIN.

tion, but these tests proved unsuccessful. Saudi Arabia, then Iraq's ally in the war against Iran, very likely financed the bulk of Iraq's nuclear program.

The director general of West Asia's leading intelligence agency revealed to this writer that his service had solid proof Iraq had obtained its uranium separation technology from South Africa's apartheid regime in exchange for oil. At that time, South Africa had built six nuclear weapons.

South Africa obtained uranium enrichment technology, as well as assistance in fusing and warhead design, from

mass destruction, was one reason driving American neocons to clamor for war on Iraq. Israel demanded a Carthaginian solution for Iraq: razing its industrial base and killing its cadre of nuclear scientists.

Faced with the embarrassment of Iraq's missing weapons, the Bush administration has quickly shifted gears, claiming its invasion was really about freeing Iraqis from a bloody, tyrannical regime. On cue, neocon commentators raised a hue and cry about Saddam's slaughter of Kurds and Shi'ites. Americans readily accepted this new *ex post facto* reason for the war.

Arts & Letters

FILM

[*Terminator 3*]

A Cyborg in Sacramento?

By Steve Sailer

THE FAST AND FUNNY "Terminator 3: The Rise of the Machines" demonstrates a surprising advantage to being a sequel. An original film with T3's purported budget of \$170 million would have needed a script dumbed down for the broadest possible audience. Fortunately, the "Terminator" series is by now so embedded in world popular culture that screenwriters John D. Brancato and Michael Ferris can simply assume that you're familiar with—and take an intelligent interest in—James Cameron's epic of killer robots from the future.

Cameron is merely collecting royalties this time, but Arnold Schwarzenegger is once again a nice Terminator sent back to protect humanity's eventual savior John Connor from a blond Terminator played by model Kristanna Loken. Like the Nordic god Loki, Loken's villainess is a trickster and shape-changer.

T3 doesn't morph into anything too original. Despite the price tag, in style it's more of a sequel to the low-budget 1984 original than the majestic 1991 T2, which seemingly brought the series to a satisfying close. Still, the screenwriters show an affectionate respect for this American classic, giving Schwarzenegger lots of moments that are witty but not campy. The competent director Jonathan Mostow pays loving tribute to Cameron's massive machine mania with

a gleeful chase between a fire truck and a monstrous crane.

The 1984 "Terminator" was a generational landmark. Having been born in 1958, during the second half of the baby boom, I grew up resenting the easily won prestige of the older baby boomers. The Bill and Hillary cohort born in the late 1940s and early 1950s had been fussed over like no generation ever. Coming right after the Birth Dearth of 1930-1945, they suffered little competition from the sparsely populated previous generation.

By the time we late baby boomers came along, though, there were tens of millions of smug older boomers clogging the pipelines to the top. Further, the youth pop-culture template—JFK-idolization, long hair, and Woodstock nostalgia—had been established, seemingly for all time. Not surprisingly, a lot of us rebelled, turning to Ronald Reagan, short hair, and the Sex Pistols.

As our interests evolved from music to movies, "Terminator" was a galvanizing discovery. The plot featured some

Arnold Schwarzenegger—with his spiky haircut, Teutonic squareness, hyper-ambitiousness, and absurd musculature—was the ultimate anti-hippie. The former Mr. Olympia bodybuilder had been a bad joke out on the geekier fringes of popular culture for a decade, but, suddenly, he was cool.

In the 1980s, muscles came back in fashion after a quarter of a century as a taste found only in trailer parks. The androgyny of male style-setters like the Rolling Stones and David Bowie was relegated to the low-rent neighborhood of the hair-metal bands.

In "Pirates of the Caribbean," by the way, Johnny Depp tries to revive the glamour rock mode. He plays a drunken, mincing, mascara-wearing fop of a buccaneer, supposedly modeled on Stones' guitarist Keith Richards, but more reminiscent of Mike Myers' parody of their other guitarist, Ronnie Wood.

In T3, Arnold's back in awesome shape, perhaps suspiciously Michelangeloesque for a 55-year old man who might run for governor of California this

IN T3 WE GET TO WATCH A **POTENTIAL GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA** PILE-DRIVE A **PRETTY GIRL HEADFIRST** THROUGH A CERAMIC URINAL. MOST WOMEN, HOWEVER, AREN'T MADE OUT OF **INSTANT-HEALING LIQUID METAL**.

1960s message about machines threatening humanity, but Cameron's inordinate fondness for technology, the mightier the merrier, shone through the tired moralizing, helping launch the boom in nerd films that is with us still.

Cameron's "Terminator" also unleashed one of the hallmarks of 1980s cinema: relentlessness. In "Aliens" and his script for Sylvester Stallone's "Rambo," he brought to the movies the headlong rush of a Clash concert.

fall. Did he go back on the juice to prepare for his nude arrival scene? Beats me, but it's a question Republicans should ask him before they fall in line behind the man who was the Timothy Leary of steroids. Admittedly, as Schwarzenegger frequently points out, his years of steroid use didn't damage him. But, then, he's obviously a man of superior resilience, while most of the boys who tried steroids to be like him were not.

Cameron, as much as anybody, is responsible for the contemporary film fetish for butt-kicking women, like big Sigourney Weaver in "Aliens" and the beefed-up Linda Hamilton in T2. This is always hyped as feminist empowerment (à la "Charlie's Angels"), but it's driven far more by the adolescent male's wish that sexy girls would stop being interested in all that boring girl stuff and start being interested in cool boy stuff like fighting and guns.

Mostow tops Cameron's obsession when in T3 we get to watch a potential governor of California pile-drive a pretty girl headfirst through a ceramic urinal. Most women, however, aren't made out of instant-healing liquid metal. Do they really benefit from Hollywood telling males to forget the tradition that it's unmanly to hit a girl? ■

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BOOKS

[*The Illusion of Victory: America in World War I*, Thomas Fleming, Basic Books, 543 pages]

In Wilson's Wake

By Robert D. Novak

A GOVERNMENT propaganda machine spews out questionable allegations to justify America going to war without its national interest being at stake. The president invokes global considerations transcending selfish nationalism. Critics of the war, Left and Right, come under attack. An aggressive attorney general tramples on liberties with hardly a peep of protest from the news media.

Is this a leftist, libertarian, or even paleoconservative critique of George W. Bush's war policies? No, it is the account by Thomas Fleming, a prolific historian

and novelist, of how President Woodrow Wilson and the United States entered World War I, how America kept Germany from winning that war, and how Wilson was complicit in the mangled peace, with tragic consequences for the future.

Fleming is labeled a contrarian, thanks to his last two nonfiction books: *Duel*, defending Aaron Burr against Alexander Hamilton, and *The New Dealers' War*, deconstructing Franklin D. Roosevelt's leadership in World War II. In fact, Woodrow Wilson has become such a sitting target for willing historians that an assault on him can hardly be called revisionist. But *The Illusion of Victory* is much more than an anti-Wilson screed. It brilliantly portrays a process that casts a long shadow over the nation's history and evokes haunting comparisons with America in the 21st century. What Fleming portrays is one of the sorry chapters in the American experience. With Germany on the verge of victory in a bloody war of attrition, Wilson takes an unprepared and unenthusiastic nation into the conflict to save the day for Britain and, however incidentally, France. All dissent is ruthlessly suppressed, as American boys are poured into the meat grinder on the Western Front. Mixing arrogance and incompetence, Wilson goes to Paris for a peace conference that makes certain a resumption of world war within two decades. With a crippling stroke hidden from the public, he concludes his presidency in a dismal performance that guarantees his country will not join his beloved League of Nations.

Fleming's story begins with Wilson, who broke a tradition of more than a hundred years by delivering his messages personally to Congress rather than sending them in writing, traveling to Capitol Hill to demand a declaration of war. "He had only the dimmest idea of how the United States would fight the war," Fleming writes, adding that Wilson "thought the United States would not have to send a single soldier to France."

That speech followed an onslaught of British propaganda, fabricating German

war atrocities and demonizing Kaiser Wilhelm and the "Prussian autocracy." Nevertheless, the great orator Wilson evoked scant reaction when he uttered his famous proclamation that "the world must be made safe for democracy." The only person to react to those words was Sen. John Sharp Williams of Mississippi, who began clapping and managed to provoke a wave of applause.

No member of Congress was a more enthusiastic interventionist than Williams, who saw the war, Fleming writes, as "a chance to redeem the secessionist South in the eyes of the ruling North." Williams exemplified the coarseness of the political class in its contempt for antiwar dissenters. He accused antiwar Sen. Robert LaFollette, the fearless Wisconsin progressive Republican, of giving a speech that was "pro-German, pretty nearly pro-Goth and pro-Vandal" and "that would have better become Herr Bethmann-Hollweg [the German chancellor]." Williams led several colleagues in introducing a resolution that denounced LaFollette as a traitor.

But Williams would only go so far in supporting Wilson—stopping short on female suffrage. The president had not really taken to the idea of women voting but was talked into supporting women's suffrage to forestall the Republicans from getting credit for passage. When Wilson tried to sell it as a war issue, Williams responded, "When the President says we can't lick Ludendorff [and] scare Bulgaria ... because nigger women in Mississippi can't vote, I decline to agree with him." Southern Democratic votes killed the proposal.

Wilson was hardly advocating a diverse America and in fact invented the odious "hyphenated Americans" label for Irish-American, Italo-American, and, certainly, German-American critics of the war as less than good Americans. The sentiment was fully shared by Wilson's bitter Republican enemies, former President Theodore Roosevelt and Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge. It was not healthy to be an "enemy alien" in the America of 1918. In Collinsville, Ill., Robert Prager was lynched simply because he was a

German immigrant, even though he said he wanted to be a citizen and had tried to enlist in the Army.

The Illusion of Victory deftly cuts between Washington politics, high diplomacy, warfare on the Western Front, and the American home front. But Fleming is most gripping in detailing gross violation of civil liberties by a president who after his death became venerated by liberals. Wilson's attorney general when the war began, Thomas W. Gregory, would make John Ashcroft look like a civil libertarian. Gregory warned dissenters to expect no mercy "from an outraged people and an avenging government": but was outdone by his successor, the notorious A. Mitchell Palmer.

Under the new Espionage and Sedition Acts, Big Bill Haywood of the radical International Workers of the World (IWW) was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Eugene V. Debs, leader of the American Socialist Party, delivered an antiwar speech in Canton, Ohio, to an audience that included the U.S. attorney from northern Ohio, with a stenographer at his side taking down Debs's every word. Debs was arrested for sedition, convicted by a jury, and sentenced to 10 years in federal prison (running for president from his cell in 1920). Unconstitutional? The Supreme Court upheld the Espionage Act, with liberal Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's opinion asserting that antiwar critics can constitute "a clear and present danger."

Not even U.S. senators were immune from the savagery. Fighting Bob LaFollette, uncompromising in his criticism of the war, ran into demands for his expulsion from the Senate by Columbia University president Nicholas Murray Butler (who fired antiwar professors and expelled antiwar students, including future movie writer and conservative columnist Morrie Ryskind). LaFollette was condemned by a 421 to 2 vote by the University of Wisconsin faculty for "disloyal utterances." Senatorial courtesy was forgotten, as future Majority Leader Joe Robinson of Arkansas told LaFollette to apply to the Kaiser for a seat in the Reichstag.

Such conduct derived from the war fever built by propaganda directed from London, as it became apparent that Britain and France could not win the war by themselves. Apocryphal German atrocity stories were verified by a special commission headed by the prestigious Viscount James Bryce. "In spite of its patent lies," Fleming writes, "the

IF THE U.S. HAD NOT **SUPPORTED THE ALLIES**, FLEMING SPECULATES, THE MILITARY STALEMATE COULD HAVE RESULTED IN A **NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN 1915**.

Bryce Report was a huge propaganda victory for the British. Convincing millions of Americans ... that the Germans were beasts in human form."

Wilson entered the war totally unprepared. The first act by the War Department in April 1917 after the declaration of war was to buy up 12,000 typewriters. The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) was untrained and poorly equipped, and the U.S. had to rely on the French for hand-me-down tanks and aircraft. Wilson was most determined that under no conditions would he permit his bitter enemy, Colonel Roosevelt, to lead a division of volunteers to France. But TR was able to send all of his sons into combat, including his youngest, 20-year-old Quentin, who joined the fledgling U.S. Army Air Service as a pilot.

Quentin Roosevelt's love affair with Flora Payne Whitney, the beautiful heiress of the Whitney and Vanderbilt fortunes, is touchingly rendered by Fleming. Harry Payne Whitney considered TR a dangerous revolutionary, and the former president regarded Whitney among the worst of the idle very rich. Nevertheless, the two young lovers were engaged, awaiting young Roosevelt's return from France. The odds that he would ever return were limited by very poor eyesight and the fact he was flying an obsolescent Nieuport borrowed from the French in combat against state-of-the-art German Fokkers.

Outnumbered by vastly superior enemy aircraft in a dogfight on July 14,

1918, Quentin took two machine gun bullets in the brain. His father's bitterness toward Wilson became personal, as explained by Fleming: "Woodrow Wilson's administration had refused to prepare for war and after war was declared, the president's appointees had failed to produce a single aircraft, in spite of spending a billion dollars."

U.S. doughboys saved Britain and France, but at a cost: 50,300 killed in action, 108,059 wounded in action, 120,139 total American dead from all causes. No American war has been so bloody over such a short span of time because, says Fleming, of the "lethal firepower of the German army and the AEF's primitive tactics." Fleming does justice to Wilson's egregious conduct at the Paris peace conference and his even more inept performance to win Senate ratification of the Versailles Treaty. The book ploughs new ground in detailing the plot by the president's wife and doctor to conceal nearly total disability following his stroke. Edith Galt Wilson actually envisioned a third term for her invalid husband and arranged an interview with him by veteran *New York World* reporter Louis Seibold for that purpose. "In obedience to Edith Wilson's orders," Fleming writes, "Seibold lied shamelessly." Seibold won the Pulitzer Prize, but Wilson was repudiated by voters in the Republican landslide of 1920.

The Illusion of Victory joins Patrick J. Buchanan's *Republic, Not An Empire* in suggesting the world would have been a much a better place had the U.S. not intervened in World War I. If the U.S. had not supported the Allies, Fleming speculates, the military stalemate could have resulted in a negotiated settlement in 1915. That would have meant no Soviet Union, no Nazi Germany, no Nazi or Soviet holocausts. Fleming marvels at the posthumous rehabilitation of Woodrow

Wilson during World War II (spurred by the lavish Darryl Zanuck film, "Wilson.") He is incredulous in reporting the 1962 survey of academic historians conducted by Arthur Schlesinger Sr. that ranked Wilson as the fourth greatest president in American history.

Fleming may not, however, fully appreciate Woodrow Wilson's role in American history. Henry Kissinger asserts in his monumental treatise, *Diplomacy*, that Woodrow Wilson's utopianism has prevailed, while Theodore Roosevelt's invocation of geopolitical reality is dead. Embracing Wilsonian doctrine, the United States no longer need cite national self-interest to go to war.

Fleming concludes by relating a visit to a memorial for Quentin Roosevelt at a little village in Champagne near the site where his plane crashed long ago. He expressed the hope that "the men and the women who guide America's covenant with power in the world of the 21st Century have the courage and the wisdom to manage our country's often perplexing blend of idealism and realism." Regrettably, these leaders all too often seem to be copying the terrible and foolish decisions chronicled here. ■

Robert D. Novak is a syndicated columnist for the Chicago Sun-Times and a CNN commentator.

[*Gulag: A History*, Anne Applebaum, Doubleday, 677 pages]

The Forgotten Terror Camps

By Richard Cummings

IN THE AFTERMATH of 9/11, the post-modernist Frederick Jamison famously observed in the *London Review of Books* that what was ostensibly a monstrous act of terrorism was, in fact, the direct result of America's policy of stamping out Communist parties throughout the

world. Presumably, he meant that Communism was the only valid means of eradicating social and economic injustices and that in the anti-Communist void created by the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites, opponents of American capitalist hegemony were left only with pre-modernist religious fanaticism as the basis for their *modus operandi*. Indeed, a careful reading of the Hamas Web site would appear to bear him out.

But while contemporary anti-modernism finds its violent expression in militant Islam, European and American intellectuals cling with religious fervor to their worship of the State, adhering to a faith in Communism and Marxist-Leninist class struggle that borders on the fanatical, in a way that is strikingly similar to an irrational faith in *jihad*.

Robert Conquest, who has effusively endorsed Anne Applebaum's *Gulag: A History*, comments in his *Reflections on a Ravaged Century* on "the persistence to this day of an adolescent revolutionary romanticism, as one of the unfortunate afflictions to which the human mind was and is prone." That persistence is best illustrated in the work of two of its most popular proponents, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in their widely praised (in academic circles) *Empire*, in which they concluded, in opposition to globalism,

This is a revolution that no power will control—because biopower and communism, cooperation and revolution remain together, in love, simplicity and also innocence. This is the irrepressible lightness and joy of being communist.

Negri is identified on the book's jacket as "an independent researcher and writer and an inmate at Rehibbia Prison, Rome," as though he were somehow a kindred spirit of Gramsci. In actuality, Negri is serving a prison sentence for the kidnapping of the scion of one of Italy's wealthiest families that led to the victim's death by suffocation—testimony not only to the myth of Communism but to its inevitable progression that culmi-

nated in its most oppressive and lethal manifestation, the Soviet *gulag*.

Applebaum, who witnessed the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe as the Warsaw correspondent for the *Economist*, observes that Martin Amis "felt moved enough by the subject of Stalin and Stalinism to dedicate an entire book to the subject" but notes that few other writers of "the political and literary Left had broached the subject." She cites the case of a British literary editor's rejection of an article because it was "too anti-Soviet." It is a small omission, but Applebaum might have explained that Martin Amis's *Koba the Dread* started out as a book about his father, Kingsley Amis, who had been a Communist before his conversion to anti-Communism and his collaboration with Robert Conquest, whose *Great Terror* remains a classic work.

With Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* now almost a relic—the credibility of which was undermined not only by Natalya Reshstovskaya's revelations, but also by Solzhenitsyn's own subtitle, "An Experiment in Literary Investigation," which suggested that he did not regard the work as historical or scientific research—Anne Applebaum's *Gulag: A History*, stands alone as the definitive account of the network of prison camps created first by Lenin and then exponentially expanded and worsened in brutality by Stalin.

What Applebaum, now an editorial-board member of the *Washington Post*, has done in *Gulag* is to describe, in painstaking detail, what the camps were like, the suffering and death of those condemned to them, and the inhuman brutality of those who administered them, as well as the role of the Cheka and its successors, including the NKVD and the KGB. In this capacity, she is a meticulous historian of the model aspired to by von Ranke. History for her is describing what actually happened, free from the relativism of Gadamer. She is, in the most powerful and scientific way, post-theory and leaves to the reader to infer the "truth" from the indisputable facts of a monstrosity so great

that it boggles the mind that anyone could fall victim to the seduction of the total state as the solution to the problems of mankind.

Some 30 million people, including children, passed through the camps during the course of their existence, a vast number of whom never made it out alive. "Hundreds of thousands of children were effectively arrested, along with their parents," Applebaum explains. "For these children, the shock of the new situation would remain with them all their lives. ... Many years later, a child of deported kulaks recalled his ordeal on the cattle train: 'People became wild ... How many days we traveled, I have no idea. In the wagon, seven people died of hunger. We got to Tomsk, and they took us out, several families. They also unloaded several corpses, children, young people and the elderly.'"

Applebaum recounts tales of brutally forced abortions, rapes, prostitution, public sex, and child abuse. A prisoner related, "I saw the nurses getting the children up in the mornings. They would force them out of their cold beds with shoves and kicks ... pushing the children with their fists and swearing at them roughly." One inmate returned at night from a day of forced labor to pick the bedbugs off of her frightened and undernourished child.

And there was the cold. "Winters, of course, were very, very cold," she writes. "Temperatures could fall to 30, 40, or 50 degrees below zero." A prisoner wrote, "It was dangerous to stop moving. During head count we jumped, ran in place, and slapped our bodies to keep warm. I perpetually kneaded my toes and curled my fingers into a fist ... touching a metal tool with a bare hand could tear off the skin, and going to the bathroom was extremely dangerous. A bout of diarrhea could land you in the snow forever."

The self-defeating nature of the camps was inherent in the mass arrests of kulaks, the entrepreneurial farmers who had provided Russia with its breadbasket. Without them and with the mass collectivization of agriculture, not even the guards ate well. Those classified as

"criminals" were not always people who had committed a real crime. "And it was even rarer for a political to have committed a real crime," Applebaum comments with irony. A simple anti-government joke could land you in a camp and sentenced to hard labor. The graver the alleged offense, from "counter-revolutionary activities" to "counter-revolutionary terrorist activities," the harsher the physical labor, a difference, in actuality, between life and death.

In addition to the text, Applebaum has assembled numerous photographs of the dead, the dying, and the living dead. In the midst of them, there is Stalin, smiling benignly at the White Sea Canal upon its completion, with the huddled prisoners in the background.

DOSTOEVSKY SAID THAT TO UNDERSTAND A COUNTRY, ONE HAD TO KNOW ITS PRISONS. APPLEBAUM, WITHOUT HISTRIONICS, SHINES A HARSH SPOTLIGHT INTO THE DARKNESS OF COMMUNISM.

"Everything was done by hand," one caption reads. "We dug earth by hand, and carried it out with wheelbarrows, we dug through the hills by hand as well ..."

There were mass "amnesties" for the war effort. But there was also Stalin's occasional ordering of the release of individual prisoners. If there is one omission in this masterful work, it is the author's reluctance to analyze sufficiently the reason for this periodic, seemingly miraculous event. Her account of Gorky's visit to the Solovetsky camp and his self-serving observations on the humaneness of the system only whets one's appetite for some deeper probing. But even without this, it is inherent in *Gulag* that Stalin was the master dictator, whose seeming capriciousness in ordering the quixotic releases, even as he orchestrated the Great Terror, kept his subjects off balance.

By displaying his feigned benevolence, Stalin manufactured and maintained the myth that he was benign and subject to personal appeals to overturn the unjust decisions of underlings about

which he had been unfamiliar. If this was similar to the "If only the Führer knew" syndrome of Nazi Germany, it had a rationale that, in its execution, made Stalin a more effective dictator than Hitler. Stalin got what he wanted—cheap labor and the eradication of opponents, real or imagined.

When the war ended, Stalin was victorious, with Churchill presenting him the sword of Stalingrad. There is now speculation that his death was not natural, that he was poisoned by members of his inner circle in the Kremlin to prevent him from launching a war against America. True or not, he died in power with his boots on, the greatest and most powerful of the tsars. And while Alan Bullock's monumental dual biography,

Hitler and Stalin, remains a seminal text on the pathology of tyranny, Anne Applebaum's *Gulag* stands beside it as the essential work on what the Soviet Union was ultimately about.

Dostoevsky said that to understand a country, one had to know its prisons. Applebaum, without histrionics, shines a harsh spotlight into the darkness of Communism, revealing the unlimited human suffering that system created and imposed.

Where was the lightness of Communism of which Hardt and Negri have written? Were they being ironic about the title of Milan Kundera's most enduring work, or were they just willfully ignorant? After *Gulag: A History*, there is no longer any excuse. ■

Richard Cummings has taught at the Haile Sellassie I University in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the University of the West Indies in Barbados. He is the author of The Pied Piper: Allard K. Lowenstein and the Liberal Dream and The Immortalists, a novel.

[*The New Faithful: Why Young Adults are Embracing Christian Orthodoxy*, Colleen Carroll, Loyola Press, 320 pages]

Gen X Goes to Church

By Ryan McMaken

IN THEIR WORK on the generation they call the "Millennials," Neil Howe and William Strauss have been predicting a shift to more subdued behavior among young people for a decade now. Their most recent book, *Millennials Rising*, describes how the youth that are now graduating from high school and entering higher education "are held to higher standards than adults apply to themselves ... they're a lot less violent, vulgar, and sexually charged than the teen culture older people are producing for them." While recent research on high-school graduates appears to back up these predictions, the Millennials may not, it turns out, be the ones on the cutting edge of these developments.

The Millennials' elders, the famed "Generation X" (so named by novelist Douglas Coupland) are exhibiting many of the same habits and social preferences. Unlike the Millennials, however, members of Generation X are generally regarded as "downcast" and "alienated" with little desire to make the most of lives that they believe have been stripped of meaning by their relentlessly materialistic Baby Boomer parents. At least, this is the story according to Coupland.

In her book, *The New Faithful: Why Young Adults are Embracing Christian Orthodoxy*, Colleen Carroll takes issue with this vision of Generation X and shows that it is the "Xers" who are actually at the front of this revolt against '60s-style permissiveness and are leading a new revival in Christian orthodoxy that has little use for the watered-down and liberal forms of religion espoused by their parents. While trying to appeal

to the younger generation by being what they perceive as "hip," it appears that all the purveyors of such Christianity have managed to gain from their young charges is contempt.

In composing this book, Carroll spent a year traveling to college campuses, charitable organizations, seminaries, and monasteries where Americans in their 20s and 30s are now a significant part of a religious revival. Evangelicals, Protestants, and Catholics are all included in her interviews and in her demographic studies, and no matter what denomination of Christianity she might be looking at, one thing is clear: the orthodox and "hardline" institutions are flourishing while the liberal and "progressive" ones are languishing.

Carroll believes this can be attributed to three strong motivations among young people: the desire to gain a sense of community, a rejection of the values of their parents, and an attraction to the uncompromising nature of orthodoxy—something they view as "authentic."

In noting the sociological evidence on Generation X, Carroll notes, "They are interested in spirituality, ignorant of tradition, and fearful of both commitment and abandonment." Much has been said about this generation's experiences with divorce and how it has affected its views of community and family. Many young people have reacted by vowing not to repeat the mistakes of their parents, although this has manifested itself both in better commitment to family and the unwillingness to commit at all. Within religious organizations, however, this impulse has taken shape as a new movement in religious obedience. According to both Protestant and Catholic leaders, young Christians "are attracted to tradition, coherence, and authenticity." They "feel strangely liberated by orthodoxy's demands of obedience and objective morality ... and they are captivated by groups that stress stability, commitment, and integration—the very values they found wanting in their splintered, mobile families and fragmented, impersonal communities."

These feelings have been identified by

many observers as the desire for "authenticity." "Weaned on Madison Avenue marketing," Carroll contends, "this audience knows when it is being pandered to, and it resists such manipulation violently." In some cases, this call to consumerism has driven Xers to abandon property altogether, joining strict religious orders. For example, two years ago, the order of the Dominican Sisters of St. Cecilia, which demands that all members abandon property and wear floor-length robes welcomed its largest group of new postulants in its entire 140-year history. Similar orders for men have also seen surges in applicants, and statistics indicate that "dioceses where bishops are considered orthodox ordain nearly five times as many priests as those run by liberal bishops."

Those who are not attracted to Eastern Orthodox or Catholic religious orders often pursue communal living conditions in non-coed houses devoted to prayer and community service. These communities of laymen of all denominations provide "fellowship" and mutual support for living in accordance with the demands of the orthodox Christian life. While less institutional than religious orders, they are no more lax in their demands about adherence to traditional Christian morality, and they are increasingly popular. Some of these organizations are devoted mostly to mutual moral support, and some emphasize service in evangelization and poverty relief. Whatever their emphasis, however, they are all centered on traditional Christian life, and while popular among the young, they do have their critics.

A constant theme in Carroll's book is the tension between the more liberal Christians of the Baby Boomer generation and their traditional juniors. More than once, middle-aged liberal faculty members at Catholic seminaries have expressed consternation that the incoming seminarians have more in common with the octogenarian priests than with themselves. Carroll notes that an increasing number of new seminarians around the country have little or no interest in challenging Church positions on the ordi-

nation of women or active homosexuals, much to the horror of the aging liberals. Fr. Zachary Hayes of Union Theological Seminary, for example, dismisses the new traditionalists as "right-wingers who want an escape from the world and validation of their extremist views."

For all types of young Christians, though, there is a general distaste for what they believe they were taught by

it's not like the faithful are in danger of being lured away by the novelty of sex, drugs, and rock and roll. Such things are anything but novel to them. Most of the twenty and thirtysomethings she interviews have made significant changes in their lives and have not pursued religious orthodoxy as simply some kind of trendy pastime. Many have given up lucrative careers and prestigious posi-

discusses are the most educated and self-motivated. Politically charged issues like abortion, feminism, homeschooling, and the separation of church and state will look considerably different than they have for the last generation. Young orthodox Christians do not see the virtue in secularization that their elders see, and Christianity may come to be seen as an important part of public life.

In the future the real challenge lies in passing on the faith of today's increasingly orthodox generation to the next one. Less enamored with the prestige of professional careers, and anxious to not emulate their parents, many orthodox Christians vow to take a closer interest in the religious formation of their children. Many have committed to homeschooling, parochial schools, and more full-time parenting. While their parents read books like *I'm OK-You're OK*, and valued the pop psychology of self-fulfillment, these current and future parents value sacrifice and commitment. Only time will tell how successful this strategy will be. If the Millennials are any indication, today's high-school students are likely to follow a similar path as their Gen X predecessors, although it remains to be seen if their children will do the same. ■

Ryan McMaken is a regular columnist for LewRockwell.com.

YOUNG ORTHODOX CHRISTIANS DO NOT SEE THE VIRTUE IN SECULARIZATION THAT THEIR ELDERS SEE.

their parents' generation. Repulsed by the sexual revolution and the divorce and illegitimate births that they attribute to the irresponsibility of the Baby Boomers, sexual attitudes among college students have been growing continually less permissive, while "covenant marriages" and "virginity pledges" have become increasingly popular. "A growing number of young evangelical Christians and conservative Catholics," Carroll reports, "are embracing the concept of courtship—the conventional way of wooing that follows a strict protocol and aims toward marriage." Professors at mainstream universities are surprised by how their students have approvingly "waxed poetic" about readings like Renaissance-era pieces recounting a woman who refused a kiss to "deliver to you a virginity whole and unblemished." While in years past, such a tale would very likely produce mockery and scorn for the author in question, modern students take what can only be described as a romantic approach.

Carroll is not so naïve as to assume that everyone who claims to support virginity is living out such things. And, finding themselves unimpressed by the moral license that their forebears supposedly "fought for," young people do not necessarily flock to orthodox Christianity. Many just find themselves cynical and isolated. Carroll recognizes that there are still significant threats to the long-term success of this religious revival, but she is optimistic. After all,

tions to "serve Christ." In contrast, the pursuit of liberalized Christianity in the '60s and '70s demanded no sacrifice, and none was given.

Many traditional Catholics may find themselves left unconvinced by the liturgies preferred by young Catholics, who, while very traditional on theological matters, tend to mix evangelical elements into their attitudes and their worship styles. Some will be disturbed by the ecumenical spirit that pervades many of these youth movements, and it may be hard for many to believe that the conversions among the people Carroll describes are as deep as she describes them. Appropriately, though, those who will probably find Carroll's arguments to be the most convincing are the very people about whom Carroll is writing. Gen X Christians like this reviewer will recognize in Carroll's book cases and stories that sound startlingly similar to the "conversion stories" and pronouncements of religious zeal that they have heard numerous times from friends and associates. The contempt harbored for the alleged glories of the sexual revolution and the supposedly progressive religion of "hippie priests" will be nothing new to those who still cringe when they recall memories of pantsuit-clad nuns who seemed more interested in singing Joan Baez songs than in teaching the faith.

If Carroll is right, however, the implications for future generations of Americans will be numerous and significant. Many of the most fervent converts she

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From Athens to Basra

For the last couple of issues, I've taken some time off in this column to write about fun things: cricket, bullfighting, pretty girls, Hemingway. Here in Europe, the "silly

season" is off and running, the time of year when people head for the beach and leave politics behind. The newspapers, especially in Britain, have to find interesting things to write about, so the transfer of an English soccer player from a Manchester club to a Spanish one becomes very big news. His wife, one Posh Spice—her professional name—is reported to be an unwelcome addition to Spanish footballers' wives' groups because she's a celebrity with an ego the size of John Podhoretz's and Ariel Sharon's combined. He is David Beckham, a good-looking young man who has a tendency to wear kaftans and dye his hair, things tough guys don't do in macho Latin countries. Victoria Beckham was part of a singing group, the Spice Girls. Her genius lies in her ability to get her name in the papers, not in her singing.

Sport, unlike politics, is never off the radar screen, especially during the summer. In ancient Greece, the spirit of competition and the sporting ideal acquired a central position in society for the first time in human history. (Blame the Greeks for that one too.) The ancient ones were smart fellows. They believed the cultivation of man's (not woman's, sorry) mental and intellectual abilities was in no way divorced from physical exercise; on the contrary, they mutually complemented each other. Sports like track-and-field and gymnastics were connected with the musical education of the young and with the entire development of the intellect. Religion, moreover, far from being opposed to this kind

of education, gave it an established position in the great panhellenic sanctuaries, where the athletic and musical contests were held under the gaze of the gods and thousands of spectators from all over the Greek world.

Enter the wise men: Socrates, Plato, Euripides, and Aristophanes. Sport is uncool, they claimed. The first to say it was Xenophanes of Kolophon in the late sixth century BC. He emphasized that the development of wisdom was much more important than strong arms and legs for the prosperity and order of the state. The great Euripides went even further: "There are ten thousand evils in Greece, but nothing is worse than the race of athletes." Ouch! Who am I, a poor little Greek boy, to argue with the greats, even though I've dedicated my life to sport—amateur sport, mind you?

AHMED CHALABI SHOULD BE IN JAIL; INSTEAD, WE ARE FINANCING HIM TO PLAY NAPOLEON OF THE DUNES.


No, the greats are right, developing one's mind has to be more important than developing one's deltoids, although I'd hate to say this in the company of surfers down California way. (Euripides who? You ripee dese trousers and you pay with your life ...) So, *gravitas* wins out.

Back to boring old Iraq, or "Eye-raq," as some American friends pronounce it. Let's face it. No matter which side you're on, Iraq is a mess—a far bigger mess than Afghanistan, and that's really say-

ing something. In strict military terms, the deaths of an American and British soldier every day is not significant. (Except to their families and loved ones, but who cares about families and loved ones when Mr. Neocon decides to send others to fight.) But guerilla campaigns are about politics, not battlefield victories. The Viet Cong lost the Tet Offensive but won the propaganda battle hands down. The purpose of Tet was to erode the will of the public back home in America, and it succeeded brilliantly. I was a hawk during that war and was right to be one. Not only was the domino theory correct, we also had a treaty with the sovereign state of South Vietnam. The brave men who fought that war—one the disgusting Bill Clinton dodged—received a belated appreciation from the American people. I was also a hawk during the first Gulf War, not because I had any love for the grotesque Kuwaiti and Saudi so-called royals—they are thieving, usurping camel-drivers and nothing more—but because Saddam had over-

run a sovereign country, as we have done recently.

The purpose of resistance in Iraq is progressively to disenchant us with a commitment to an alien society where our soldiers' sacrifice is unappreciated. I am not saying that Iraq is like Vietnam. At least not yet. But the administration's absence of a credible political strategy is undeniable. There is a vacuum in Iraq, and it's being filled by guerilla gunmen and Islamofascists grimly familiar in the



area. Here's Scott McConnell writing in "Taki's Top Drawer" as long ago as August 1999: "Much of the intellectual establishment (read neocons) wants to bury under the rug the issue of whether Washington's various military interventions and ultimatums are raising the risks ordinary Americans have to run in the name of high-sounding goals. In fact there is not a single cause that Clinton, Albright, the *New Republic* or the *Weekly Standard* wants Americans to fight for—multi-ethnic democracy in Kosovo (what a sad joke that has turned out to be), democracy in Iraq, the end of Islamic fundamentalism in Iran, or indeed any of their pet issues—that is worth casualties in an American city."

Hear, hear! Our executive editor was rather prescient, wouldn't you say? Four years later, the you-know-what has hit the fan big time. Here's Peter Hitchens writing from Baghdad: "It is not that Iraqis yearn for the return of Saddam—hardly anyone is sorry that he has gone. It is that they recognize—as Washington has yet to—that if you behead a system based upon a single tyrant and his single party, you need to provide an alternative authority immediately." In this the Bushies have failed as spectacularly as Clinton did when he said he never had sex with that woman, Miss Lewinsky. Neocon theorists like Michael Ledeen can dream Mussolini-like fantasies of conquests (according to John Laughland, fascism inspires Ledeen's theories), but who are these buffoons trying to kid? Well, that's an easy one: the American people, that's who.


The problem of war termination is comparatively new to Western states. Traditionally, wars between sovereign governments were ended with a knock-

out blow, the loser on the canvas surrendering and accepting a peace settlement. The British never truly managed to rule post-Ottoman Iraq. There were revolts and massacres and more deployments of troops. The Brits divided and ruled, using Iraqi minorities along with RAF bombing of dissident tribesmen. Post-Ottoman Iraq became easy to run only under—yes, you guessed it—Saddam Hussein. The current situation of chaos—and believe me it is chaos, no matter what the spin doctors say—has persisted since 1918, except for the Saddam years. What is now needed to save face is an exit strategy. A strongman is bound to emerge, and it's not going to be the convicted embezzler Ahmed Chalabi, the darling of our dear Defense Secretary. (Chalabi should be in jail; instead, we are financing him to play Napoleon of the Dunes.)

What I want to know is who will pay for this madcap venture based on false intelligence and a plagiarized essay by a student? (No Hollywood studio would accept this scenario, yet most Americans have.) It was all about WMD, but it turned out to be a tragic farce. We have destroyed Iraq in order to save it, have killed thousands, and lost hundreds. Nothing has been resolved, the waves and cheers have turned to hatred and cold-blooded murder of our soldiers, yet those responsible for the mess are riding high. If I had my way, the warmongers would be named by a bipartisan commission; stripped of their television spots, columns, magazines, and newspapers; made to apologize to the families of those who have lost their loved ones on both sides; and then sent to exile in Monte Carlo or Palm Beach. For the duration. Amen! ■

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